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HIGHER SPEED LIMITS AND SAFETY: 
THE CASE OF PRODUCE HAULERS
by
Richard Beilock 
University of Florida
INTRODUCTION
Despite heightened concerns regarding motor carrier safety, in 
the spring of 1987 the U.S. Congress enacted legislation permitting 
states to increase speed limits to 65 miles per hour along most rural 
portions of the Interstate System and, subsequently, along rural 
portions of comparable roadways. It is generally recognized that 
accidents tend to be more severe the higher the speeds of the 
vehicles involved. Relative to automobiles, heavy trucks have larger 
mass, longer stopping distance, and more limited maneuverability; in 
addition, the probability of jackknifing increases at higher speeds. In 
its recent report to Congress, the Office of Technology Assessment 
found a strong positive relationship between posted speed limits and 
fatal truck accidents. It concluded:
In view of the major role speed plays in fatal truck 
accidents and the many characteristics of heavy 
vehicles that make more difficult and time consuming 
to stop safely, Congress may wish to reexamine the 
decision to permit truck speeds of 65 mph at the 
discretion of States and to explore other methods 
of controlling excessive speeds for heavy vehicles.
(OTA, p. 105)
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Along with speed, driver fatigue is widely recognized as a major 
safety hazard. Drivers are normally paid on a piece rate basis (i.e., by 
the mile or load),1 and shipper/receivers or carriers normally set 
schedule requirements. Therefore, drivers may have incentives to 
drive longer and/or faster than is prudent or legal. In a study of 346 
severe accidents involving motor carriers, U.S. D.O.T. found 27 
percent due to excessive speed, 25 percent linked to driver fatigue 
or dozing at the wheel, and a further 21 percent associated with 
inattention, which could be a sign of fatigue. Moreover, 11 percent 
of the drivers had falsified log books or were otherwise found to be 
in violation of Hours of Service Regulations (HSR).2
A possible safety benefit from higher speed limits could be less 
pressure on drivers to speed or drive for long periods. With higher 
speed limits, a driver should be able to complete the same amount 
of work as before in a shorter time without violating speed limits or 
HSR. This advantage could be reduced or eliminated if schedules 
were adjusted to require more work per unit time. For example, 
Beilock and Capelle (1988) found that among general freight 
haulers, the combination of schedule adjustments and the 65 mph 
speed limit had resulted in very modest reductions in pressures to 
speed or violate HSR.
In this paper, the effects of higher speed limits on the pressures 
experienced by produce haulers to violate speed or HSR are exam­
ined. These pressures are measured, in this study, in terms of the 
relationship between the time allowed drivers to move from origin 
to destination points and the amount of time necessary to legally 
cover these distances. Schedules with smaller allowed time to 
legally-necessary time ratios will be referred to as being "tighter.” 
The exact methodology employed for measuring schedule tightness 
is discussed in the next section. Produce haulers are of particular 
interest because they are likely to be subjected to greater shipper/ 
receiver-induced pressures to deliver quickly than are those hauling 
most other goods. Indeed, a comparison of produce haulers and 
nonproduce haulers indicates that the former are much more likely
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to be on schedules which would force violations of speed limit or 
HSR.3 This follows because produce is highly perishable and 
because most of the buying activity on wholesale produce markets is 
concentrated into a few hours each day. A late delivery to a market, 
even by as little as an hour, can result in a much reduced price 
received or force expensive refrigerated storage for a day (if avail­
able) or both.
The specific objectives of this paper are to:
1. Develop and compare schedule tightness estimates for 
long-distance produce haulers before and since passage 
of legislation permitting 65 mph speed limits.
2. Examine the sensitivity of the results to assumptions 
regarding previous driving times and average speeds 
attainable with 65 miles per hour speed limits.
3. Assess whether or not there are significant differences in 
schedule tightness by driver, carrier, or trip characteristics.
DATA AND METHODOLOGY
Data for this study are drawn from two surveys of produce 
haulers as they exited the Florida Peninsula. The first survey was 
conducted for three, two-day sessions during the 1984/85 growing 
season. One thousand three hundred and forty-six drivers were 
interviewed.4 The second effort involved interviewing 1,762 drivers 
over four, two-day sessions during the 1987/88 growing season.
The sites for both surveys were the Florida Agricultural Inspec­
tion Stations located on U.S. 1-10, I-75, and I-95. All trucks passing 
the stations are required to stop. These three sites account for 85 to 
90 percent of all traffic and all other roadways have similar stations 
(so avoidance is not an option). Refusal rates at each station were 
low, averaging under 10 percent.5
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Drivers were asked a wide range of questions regarding their 
current produce load, the trip which brought them to Florida, and 
some demographic information. Interspersed among these were 
questions regarding: pickup points, drop points, number of drivers, 
and latest time the driver could arrive at the first drop without being 
late.6 The answers to these questions, a record of the time and place 
of the interview, and mileage estimates7 were used as inputs in 
calculating schedule tightness. The spreading of these questions 
across the interviews and the nonthreatening approach used for the 
survey essentially eliminated the problem of response bias due to 
self-protection motives. In over 3,000 interviews no respondent 
ever indicated awareness that we were developing information to 
estimate schedule tightness.
The tightness of a schedule may be gauged by either the amount 
(or percent) of time over or under the legal limit necessary to drive 
while obeying speed limits, or by the average speed necessary while 
obeying HSR. For this study, the latter approach was adopted. The 
estimated average speed necessary to maintain the schedule (as far 
as the first destination subsequent to the interview) is denoted as 
SCHSPD. Three basic assumptions were made:
1. The driver drove nonstop from central or southern Florida 
to the interview sight. For 1984/85 this driving time was 
assumed to be 4 hours. For 1987/88 driving time to the 
interview sites were estimated according to distance 
calculations. As a practical matter, the two approaches 
were essentially identical.8
2. The driver was fully rested prior to the trip. (That is, there 
were no driving or on-duty hours that would affect HSR 
calculations.) 3 *
3. All roadways in a state used by a trucker had speed limits
equivalent to the highest speed limit in that state.
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Except for stops for fuel and meals, the assumption that drivers 
drove nonstop from the origin points to the interview sites is proba­
bly true in virtually all instances. The interviews were conducted 
each day from 6:00pm to 1:00am. It seems unlikely if many drivers 
passing the inspection stations during these hours had slept between 
picking up their loads and reaching North Florida. This would not 
be true if the interviews had been conducted from 3:00am through 
noon.
Assuming that drivers were fully rested prior to their current 
journey is extremely conservative. As part of the analysis of the 
1987/88 data, this assumption was relaxed. Also conservative is the 
assumption that all roadways used to cross a state have speed limits 
equal to the highest in the state. The assumption is particularly 
unrealistic for speeds over 55 MPH, because such speeds are legal 
only on eligible rural Interstates and comparable limited-access 
highways. The effect of relaxing this assumption for states with 
maximum speed limits over 55 MPH will also be explored.
To facilitate the pre/post 65 MPH comparison of schedules, 
55-MPH-time-equivalent distances (DIST55) were calculated as 
follows:
(1) DIST55 = DIST* (55/SPDM AX)
where: DIST = actual distance
SPDMAX = maximum speed limit in state
In other words, DIST55 is the distance which could be traveled at 
55 MPH in the same time as the actual distance could be crossed at 
the prevailing maximum speed limit. For example, if the actual 
distance to be traversed across a state was 300 miles and the 
prevailing maximum speed limit in the state was 55 MPH, then the 
actual (300 mile) distance would be employed in calculating sched­
ule tightness. However, if the prevailing maximum speed limit was 
60 MPH, then 275 miles (300 x 55/60 = 275) would be used in the 
calculation, and 253.85 miles (300 x 55/65 = 253.85) would be
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FIGURE 1
MAXIMUM SPEED FOR TRUCKS ON RURAL INTERSTATE HIGHWAYS, 1987-1988
used if the maximum speed limit were 65 miles per hour. This 
adjustment, is intended to eliminate or control for changes in speed 
limits; i.e., to make SCHSPD estimates consistent regardless of the 
speed limits in force. The maximum speed limits in force for trucks 
in each of the 48 Continental U.S. States at the time of the 1987/88 
survey are presented in Figure 1.
To accomplish objective 2, the analysis was repeated, using the 
1987/88 data, with the following modifications:
1. To test sensitivity to previous driving time, schedule 
tightness was successively recalculated with 1,2, 3, ... 
and 8 hours of driving time added to the origin-to- 
survey site portion of the movement
2. The analysis was also repeated with the following 
maximum legally attainable speeds assumed:
Maximum legal 
speed limit
60
65
Maximum legally 
attainable speed
57.5
60
and
Maximum legal 
speed limit
60
65
Maximum legally 
attainable speed
55
55
For Objective 3, contingency table analysis or simple 
correlations between schedule tightness measures, on the one hand, 
and selected driver, carrier, and trip characteristics, on the other
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hand, was performed. While of interest, misleading results from 
such univariate analyses is possible as an uncontrolled covariate(s) 
may mask true relationships. Therefore, a multivariate approach was 
desirable. To meet this need, the following regression was 
estimated:
(2) SCHSPD =b0 + b/DIST2 + b/RAT65 + b3*DRIVERS + 
b4*EXPER + b5*AUTH + b6*PRIV +
b7 OWNOP + ba*VALUE + E
Where:
b0 ... 8 = unknown parameters to be estimated
DIST2 = actual distance from interview site to 
the next destination.
RAT65 = the proportion of DIST2 through states 
with maximum speed limits above
55 MPH
DRIVERS = the number of drivers in the tractor
EXPER = the years of professional driving 
experience of the individual driving 
the truck at the time of the interview
AUTH = equals 1 if the firm owning the tractor 
has an ICC authority, zero otherwise
PRIV = equals 1 if a private carrier, zero 
otherwise
OWNOP = equals 1 if an owner-operator, zero 
otherwise
VALUE = equals 1 if strawberries, tomatoes, or 
ornamentals, zero otherwise
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The rationales for postulating that SCHSPD might be a function of 
each of these variables are briefly discussed below.
HSR mandate periodic rests. If schedules do not fully account 
for these stops, violation-inducing schedules will result (i.e.,
SCHSPD's will tend to be higher than are legally attainable). The 
longer the distance, the longer the driving time necessary, and the 
more legally required rest stops, ceteris paribus. Therefore, if stops 
are not fully accounted for in schedules, schedules will tend to be 
higher, the longer the distance (DIST2). By similar reasoning, if 
schedules have not been fully adjusted to take advantage of higher- 
than-55 MPH speed limits, SCHSPD and the proportion of DIST2 with 
higher speed limits (RAT65) should be inversely related.
Team driving allows one driver to rest without stopping the 
vehicle. Therefore, it is expected that, on average, SCHSPD would 
be lower for similar trips if team drivers are used (i.e., if DRIVERS is 
greater than one).
EXPER is included on the premise that more experienced drivers 
may differ from their less experienced colleagues regarding the 
tightness of the schedules they are willing to accept or expected to 
meet. There may also be differences in SCHSPD across carrier types 
(OWNOP and PRIV, with for-hire fleets as the omitted category) and 
between those holding and not holding Interstate Commerce 
Commission Authorities. Reasons for such hypotheses include the 
widespread perception among drivers that owner-operators are the 
most likely to disregard speed and HSR (Beilock and Capelle, 1987), 
and the Office of Technology Assessment's findings that ICC-exempt 
carriers have higher violation rates and more serious safety problems 
(OTA , p. 99).
Tomatoes, strawberries, and ornamentals are among the most 
valuable and/or perishable crops hauled out of Florida. Freight rates 
for higher valued commodities generally tend to be higher. DeVany
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and Saving suggest that this may be due to demands for expedited 
service. If true, delivery schedules for these commodities would be 
expected to be tighter, ceteris paribus, than for less valuable com­
modities.
RESULTS
Pre and Post 65 MPH Scheduling
The results indicate that between 1984/85 and there has been a 
marked easing of the schedules produce/ornamentals drivers operate 
under. The average SCHSPD for 1984/85 was 50.5 MPH versus 40.9 
MPH in 1987/88. This difference is easily significant at the .01 Level 
of probability.
What percent of the drivers in each year had violation-inducing 
schedules? The rule of thumb for the U.S. Department of Transpor­
tation's Office of Motor Carrier Standards is that for trips over 10 
hours duration (as was the case for virtually all in the samples) on 
roadways with 55 MPH speed limits, average speeds over 45 MPH 
are suspect (violation-suspect schedules) and over 50 MPH are 
considered impossible without violating the speed limit or HSR or 
both (violation-inducing schedules). By this rule, 44 percent of the 
drivers in 1984/85 had violation-suspect schedules and 35 percent 
had schedules which were clearly violation-inducing. The corre­
sponding percentages in 1987/88 were 32 and 22 percent, respec­
tively (Table 1). While the drop in clearly violation-inducing sched­
ules from a over a third to less than a quarter is impressive, it should 
be remembered that this is still a very high percentage and that 
extremely conservative assumptions were used to develop the 
estimates. The impacts of relaxing those assumptions are discussed 
in the next subsection.
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The results also suggest that the easing of schedules is due in 
large measure to higher speed limits, rather than to changes in 
schedules. In Figure 2 the percentages of drivers whose schedules 
required them to exceed speeds from 30 to 80 MPH (while obeying 
HSR) are presented. A smaller percentage of the 1987/88 drivers 
needed to exceed each speed level to stay on schedule than was 
true for the 1984/85 drivers. However, if the 55 MPH National 
Speed Limit had still been in force in 1987/88, the results for both 
years would have been virtually identical over a wide range of 
speeds (in Figure 2 and Table 1, compare 1984/85 and 1987/88- 
unadjusted).
TABLE 1
PERCENTAGES OF DRIVERS NEEDING TO EXCEED SELECTED 
AVERAGE SPEEDS
Average Trip Speed
45 MPH 50 MPH 55 MPH
1984/85 drivers 44 35 38
1987/88 drivers 32 22 15
1987/88 drivers (1/2 adj)1 37 29 20
1987/88 drivers (unadjusted)2 43 34 28
Notes: ’Maximum attainable speeds with 60 MPH speed limits assumed to
be 57.5 MPH. For states with 65 MPH speed limits, maximum 
attainable speeds of 60 MPH assumed.
2All states treated as though they had 55 MPH speed limits.
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FIGURE 2
SCHEDULE TIGHTNESS BEFORE AND AFTER 65 MPH SPEED LIMITS
Percent of Drivers Needing Higher 
Speed to Meet Schedule
Speed Necessary To Meet Schedule (SCHSPD)
• 1984/85 ■ 1987/88 □ 1987/88 (unadjusted)
RELAXING ATTAINABLE SPEED AND PREVIOUS 
DRIVING ASSUMPTIONS
The assumption that all roadways used have speed limits equal 
to the highest in the state no doubt results in underestimates of 
schedule tightness. This is likely to be particularly true for states with 
speed limits exceeding 55 MPH, because such speed limits are only 
applicable to rural portions of selected limited-access highways. It 
may seem more reasonable, therefore, to discount a portion of the 
speeds above 55 MPH. As discussed in the previous subsection, 
without such discounting, the 1987/88 schedules appear to be much 
looser than those in 1984/85, but with complete discounting (i.e., 
with no "credit” for supra-55 MPH speeds) the results for both years 
are essentially identical (Figure 2 and Table 1).
Taking the middle ground of crediting half of the supra-55 MPH 
speeds (equivalent to assuming that half the roadways used in a state 
have supra-55 MPH speed limits) still results in significant improve­
ments over 1984/85. While in 1984/85 the average SCHSPD was 
50.5 MPH, the 1987/88 average would be 43.7 MPH and only 29 
percent would have clearly violation-inducing schedules (Table 1).
Assuming the driver had not logged driving or on duty time prior 
to the current produce haul is also extremely conservative. Earlier in 
the day, many, if not most drivers spent several hours of driving or 
on-duty time dropping off the previous load and repositioning for 
one or several pickups. Driving during the days immediately preced­
ing the produce haul would also have an impact if the driver is close 
to the 60 hour limit (see footnote 2). However, there was not 
sufficient time with each respondent to determine his/her recent 
driving/on-duty history and, moreover, such inquiries would have 
alerted drivers regarding our intent to determine legal and illegal 
schedules.
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Schedule tightness is very sensitive to the amount of prior 
driving time. Going from zero to 4 hours prior driving time, the 
number of drivers with violation-suspect schedules (i.e., SCHSPD 
over 45 MPH) increases by nearly a fifth from 32 to 38 percent of all 
drivers, and the violation-inducing schedules (i.e., SCHSPD over 50 
MPH) increases by nearly half from 22 to 31 percent of all drivers 
(Table 2). With 8 hours prior driving, 44 percent of all drivers have 
violation-suspect schedules and 35 percent have violation-inducing 
schedules. Again, it was impossible to determine the actual number 
of previous driving and on-duty hours for each driver. Therefore, 
the conservative approach of assuming none was adopted. The 
sensitivity of the results to this assumption suggests that considerably 
more drivers actually have violation-suspect or violation-inducing 
schedules than is indicated under the zero prior driving time as­
sumption.
DIFFERENCES IN SCHSPD ACCORDING TO CARRIER, 
DRIVER, AND TRIP CHARACTERISTICS
Identifying driver, carrier, and trip characteristics associated with 
tight schedules would be of value to policymakers and industry 
participants. In this subsection, the associations of selected charac­
teristics with SCHSPD are examined via both univariate and multi­
variate analyses.
Univariate Analysis
There are no indications of (statistically significant) differences 
regarding schedule tightness across carrier types or between carriers 
possessing and not possessing ICC Authorities (Table 3). These 
results are consistent with the position that structural changes and 
reduced economic regulations do not or only tangentially impact 
upon attained safety Levels.
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TABLE 2
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN (SCHSPD) AND THE NUMBER 
OF HOURS ASSUMED DRIVERS IMMEDIATELY PRIOR TO 
CURRENT TRIP
Hours of prior Percent of drivers with SCHSPD over
driving time 45 MPH1 50 MPH2
0 32 22
1 34 25
2 36 28
3 37 29
4 38 31
5 39 31
6 40 32
7 43 33
8 44 35
Notes: ’Violation-suspect schedule.
Violation-inducing schedule.
Team drivers are only about a third as likely as single drivers to 
have violation-suspect or violation-inducing schedules (Table 3). 
This finding no doubt reflects understandable reticence on the part 
of some carriers to employ a second driver. According to USDA 
estimates (Buxton), variable costs for a fleet-owned produce truck 
were 92 cents per mile in April 1989, of which fully 33 cents was 
associated with the driver (pay, food allowance, etc.). Unless a
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second driver can significantly reduce transit time, it is clear that 
team driving is extremely expensive. However, the dramatic 
differences in schedule tightness suggest the importance of team 
driving.
Consistent with DeVany and Saving's contention that higher 
valued cargoes receive expedited service, the schedules are much 
tighter for strawberry, ornamental, and tomato loads, on average, 
than for other commodities (Table 3). This result may also explain, 
at least in part, why higher valued produce and ornamentals tend to 
command higher freight rates than do other commodities for similar 
hauls.
Suggesting that legally mandated rest periods are not fully 
accounted for in schedules, the distance to the first post-interview 
destination is positively correlated with SCHSPD (Table 3). The 
percent of that distance through states with speed limits over 55 
MPH is negatively correlated with SCHSPD. This result suggests that 
dispatchers have not fully adjusted schedules to take advantage of 
higher speed limits.
Years of professional driving experience is negatively related to 
SCHSPD (correlation significantly different from zero at the .05 level, 
Table 3). This may reflect increased prudence with greater experi­
ence. Alternatively, this result (and the others presented in this 
subsection) may be an artifact of not controlling for other variables, 
such as trip distance. For this reason I now turn to the multivariate 
analysis.
Multivariate Analysis
Considering the exploratory nature of this work, the results of 
the regression analysis are quite good. The equation is highly 
significant, the signs and magnitudes of the parameter estimates are 
consistent with expectations, and several are highly significant (Table 
4). Only 10 percent of the variation in SCHSPD is explained by the
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TABLE 3
SCHEDULE TIGHTNESS AND SELECTED CARRIER, 
DRIVER, AND TRIP CHARACTERISTICS
Drivers with SCHSPD over
45MPH 50MPH
Item Percent Chi sq. Percent Chi sq.
Carrier status:
For-hire fleet 30 21
Private carrier 33 27
Owner-operator 33 2.8 21 3.8
ICC Authority:
Yes 34 1.8 24
No 31 21 1.9
Drivers:
Single
Team
36 24
10 52.8*** 9 24.3***
High value cargo:1
Yes 40 29
No 30 13.1*** 20 11.9***
Item Correlation with SCHSPD
Distance to first post­
interview destination (DIST2) .11***
Percentage of DIST2 through states with
speed limits above 55 MPH -.11***
Years of driving experience -.06* *
Notes: ’High value cargoes considered to be strawberries, ornamentals,
and tomatoes.
*** statistically significant at the .01 level
** statistically significant at the .05 level 
* statistically significant at the .10 level
TABLE 4
MULTIVATIATE ANALYSIS OF SCHEDULE TIGHTNESS
Dependent variable: SCHSPD
Independent variables Estimated parameters (standard error)
Intercept 59.44
(3.49)
DIST2 .0065***
(.0013)
RAT65 -.095***
(.023)
PRIV 1.20**
(.55)
OWNOP .13
(1.34)
AUTH 3.20***
(1.24)
DRIVERS -14.59***
(1.60)
EXPER -.13***
(.048)
VALUE 5.59***
(1.33)
Equation statistics:
F Statistic
R2
Number of observations
18.88***
.10
1,454
Notes: *** statistically significant at the .01 level
** statistically significant at the .05 level 
* statistically significant at the .10 level
equation. However, this is not surprising due to the limited informa­
tion available. The inclusion of data on factors such as price levels 
and trends for commodities at the various destinations,9 vehicle age 
and condition, driver health and prior driving/on-duty history no 
doubt would have improved the explanatory power of the equation.
The parameter estimates associated with DIST2 and RAT65 are 
both easily significant at the .01 level and are, respectively, positive 
and negative. This supports the results of the univariate analysis that 
schedules tend to be tighter the longer the distance and looser the 
greater the percentage of that distance over roadways with speed 
limits in excess of 55 MPH.
The parameter estimate associated with PRIV is positive and 
significant at the .05 level, indicating that private carriers tend to 
maintain somewhat tighter schedules than for-hire fleets (incorpo­
rated in the intercept). The parameter estimate associated with 
OWNOP also is positive, but is not different from either for-hire fleets 
of private carriers at any conventional level of probability.
Carriers possessing ICC Authorities appear to maintain tighter 
schedules then those not possessing such authorities. The parameter 
estimate associated with AUTH is significant at the .01 level and 
indicates that drivers for carriers with ICC Authorities must average 
3.2 MPH faster to stay on schedule than drivers for independent 
carriers. This result flies in the face of the "common wisdom" 
expounded by many in the trucking industry that carriers subject to 
economic regulation are the more safety conscious. It should be 
noted that the relationship between AUTH and SCHSPD was not 
significant at conventional levels in the univariate analysis. Evidently 
not controlling for the other covariates masked the relationship.
The relationship between SCHSPD and EXPER is also stronger 
when controlling for the covariates (significant at the .01 level in the 
multivariate analysis and at the .05 level in the univariate analysis). 
The negative sign of the estimated parameter indicates that the more
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experienced the driver, the looser the schedule, ceteris paribus. 
While the estimated relationship is highly significant in a statistical 
sense, the magnitude of the parameter is small (.13). For a one MPH 
reduction in SCHSPD based on experience, an individual would have 
to have driven nearly additional 8 years.
The relationship between VALUE and SCHSPD is positive and 
highly significant in both the univariate and the multivariate analyses. 
The estimated parameter in the equation indicates that drivers 
hauling tomatoes, strawberries, or ornamentals must average 5.59 
MPH faster to stay on schedule than drivers hauling other commodi­
ties.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
It is generally recognized that accident severity tends to increase 
with speed. From a safety standpoint, therefore, the only benefit 
from increased speeds would be reduced fatigue resulting from 
shorter driving times per unit distance. This advantage, however, 
could be dissipated if schedules were adjusted. The primary pur­
pose of this study has been to determine the impact on the tightness 
of the schedules maintained by produce/ornamentals haulers from 
abandoning the 55 MPH National Speed Limit. This group of drivers 
was of interest because they operate under unusually tight sched­
ules, presumably due to the value and perishability of their cargos 
(Beilock and Capelle 1987). The role of value in scheduling was 
supported in this study by the finding that drivers hauling higher­
valued perishables (i.e., tomatoes, strawberries, and ornamentals) 
operate under much tighter schedules, on average, than do those 
hauling lower-valued perishables.
In addition to tight schedules, produce/ornamentals haulers 
frequently operate under fairly rigid schedules. This rigidity is 
primarily the result of the manner in which much of the product is 
marketed and distributed. Most produce is delivered to wholesale
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produce markets, chainstore warehouses, or individual supermar­
kets. Each of these tend to operate in fairly set 24 hour cycles, with 
produce/plant deliveries being desirable only for specific periods.
The large majority of transactions at wholesale produce markets 
normally take place during a three to 3-4 hour period each day 
(usually from 2:00 AM to 6:00 AM). Produce that is late may have 
to be sold at a steep discount or stored overnight, if refrigerated 
space is available. Chainstore warehouses normally do not hold 
extensive inventories of perishable produce or plants. Rather, they 
endeavor to coordinate deliveries as close to outshipment times as 
possible. It is not uncommon for produce to be distributed to local 
delivery vehicles directly from the incoming linehaul truck. Similarly, 
individual stores have minimal storage capacities. Most produce and 
plant deliveries are immediately used to replenish the display cases. 
For all three of these facility types (i.e., wholesale produce markets, 
chainstore warehouses, and individual stores) deliveries a few hours 
early or late are highly undesirable. Unless a carrier can deliver a 
full day earlier, often there is no advantage to altering schedules.
The rigidity of the schedules is believed by the author to be the 
primary reason for the finding that scheduling demands on drivers 
have eased as a result of the return to speed limits above 55 MPH. 
The comparison of the 1984/85 and 1987/88 data indicated virtually 
no changes in schedules. The higher speed limits in effect in 1987/ 
88 resulted, therefore, in reduced schedule tightness. It should be 
stressed that the extent to which the salutary effects of eased 
schedule tightness offset the negative effects increased accident 
severity with higher speeds is entirely unknown.
Similar results may be expected for shipments of other types of 
freight for which transportation demand conditions create rigidity in 
delivery schedules. Conditions which suggest rigid delivery sched­
ules include: deliveries directly to retailers and deliveries to receiv­
ers having limited storage capacities and/or essentially immutable 
sales or production schedules.
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Schedule tightness was found to increase with distance. This 
suggests that schedules typically do not fully account for legally- 
mandated rest periods. Another indication of this was the much 
lower rate of violation-inducing schedules among team drivers than 
among those operating solo. It may be prudent, therefore, for 
enforcement efforts regarding compliance with Hours-of-Service 
Regulations to focus on solo, long-distance drivers.
Perhaps the most surprising finding was that drivers for carriers 
possessing ICC Authorities tend to have tighter schedules than those 
who operate independently. A possible explanation for this result is 
that possession of an ICC Authority is an indication of carrier sophisti­
cation and organizational ability. If profit enhancement by optimiz­
ing equipment and personnel usage is a carrier's primary goal, then 
it would be expected that more sophisticated carriers would have 
tighter schedules, ceteris paribus. Whatever the reason, combined 
with the finding that there are only minor differences in schedule 
tightness across carrier types, the study suggests that at least this 
dimension of safety will not suffer as a result of economic deregula­
tion.
Finally, while increased speed limits appear to have reduced 
schedule tightness among produce/ornamentals haulers, the prob­
lem is still severe. Employing extremely conservative assumptions, it 
is estimated that nearly a third of the drivers had violation-suspect 
schedules and over one in five had violation-inducing schedules. 
Relaxation of those assumptions resulted in far higher estimates of 
schedule tightness.
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FOOTNOTES
*This study was funded in part by the Market Facilities Branch, 
Agricultural Marketing Service, United States Department of Agricul­
ture.
11n a survey of 1,762 long distance drivers, 93 percent were paid 
by the mile or load (Beilock, 1988).
2Hours of Service Regulations set legal limits to driving and on- 
duty hours. The basic provisions are:
1. 10 Hour Rule: For every 10 hours of driving time there 
must be at least 8 hours off-duty time.
2. 15 Hour On-Duty Rule: No person may drive after 
having been on duty for 15 consecutive hours.
3. No person may drive for more than 60 hours in 7 
consecutive days.
3Beilock and Capelle (1987) found that 27 percent of a sample 
of nonproduce drivers had violation-inducing schedules versus 44 
percent for produce haulers.
4The results of that study were presented in Beilock (1985).
5The high level of cooperation was due to several factors. The 
agricultural inspection stations normally are nonthreatening to 
truckers. Few citations are written and delays are normally slight. 
The enumerators wore University of Florida identification and 
introduced themselves as students. The questionnaires were brief, 
drivers were not asked to identify themselves or their company, and 
were assured of anonymity.
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6The latest time which the driver believes he/she can arrive at a 
destination may differ from the actual requirements of the carrier or 
receiver. Such differences may be due to miscommunication 
between carrier and driver, the driver misjudging the leeway he/she 
actually has, or the driver having personal reasons for wishing to 
arrive earlier or later. However, for the purpose of gauging the 
tightness of the schedule the truck actually operates under, the 
driver's perception of the schedule, rather than that of the carrier or 
the receiver, is relevant.
7The source for calculating mileages was Household Goods 
Carrier's Bureau.
8The 1984/85 interviews took place during months in which 
virtually all produce originated between 200 and 350 miles south of 
the interview sites. However, nearly a third of the 1987/88 inter­
views were conducted when production areas located within a few 
miles of the interview sites were active. Therefore, while the 4 hour 
driving time rule for 1984/85 was a reasonable (though somewhat 
conservative) estimate, calculations based upon actual mileages were 
important for 8.
It should be noted that detailed questioning regarding previous 
driving and on-duty time was not undertaken both due to interview 
time constraints and likely problems with response bias (i.e., eva­
sion).
9Falling (rising) produce prices would encourage receivers to de­
mand faster (slower) deliveries, ceteris paribus.
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TRAFFIC MANAGERS AFTER DEREGULATION: 
NEW MOUNTAINS TO CLIMB!
by
Kenneth H. Forsythe, James C. Johnson, and 
Kenneth C. Schneider 
St. Cloud State University, Minnesota
INTRODUCTION
Transportation deregulation was started by the ICC and CAB in 
the mid-1970s and this trend accelerated when it was championed 
by President Jimmy Carter. Deregulation laws were enacted by 
Congress in the airline industry (1977 and 1978), the trucking 
industry (1980) and the rail industry (1980). We now have over a 
decade of experience with transportation deregulation which has 
substantially altered the transportation industry. Instead of govern­
ment regulatory agencies establishing rates and services, these 
competitive factors are now determined by marketplace forces. The 
traffic management function has been drastically affected by the new 
competitive environment found in the transportation industry. The 
purpose of this article is to briefly review what traffic management 
was like before and after deregulation. Then the results of a survey 
involving 215 traffic managers will be examined. Specifically, traffic 
managers were asked how deregulation impacted their position and 
then they were asked to tell us, in their words, why they answered 
as they did.
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TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT BEFORE DEREGULATION
Before deregulation, when the federal government was heavily 
involved with day-to-day transportation issues, such as rates and 
service offerings, the traffic management function was a Byzantine 
world of gigantic tariffs — frequently a single tariff would be greater 
than a thousand pages — and incredibly complex federal regulations. 
Roy W. Mayeske worked for six years at Minnesota Mining and 
Manufacturing [3M] in purchasing and then — to his chagrin — was 
transferred to the traffic department. He felt at the time that this 
new position was the equivalent of being sent into exile to corporate 
Siberia. Mayeske declared:
My career path had no plans for transportation.
If you look at transportation 15 years ago [1973), 
it was highly regulated -- there were all kinds of 
books with chapter and verse as to what you 
could do and couldn't do. My initial reaction 
was: Where did I goof and why am I getting 
this punishment.1
Mayeske, who eventually came to like traffic management, 
advanced at 3M to his current position of executive director of 
transportation. Reflecting back on his initiation into transportation, 
he noted that he was suspect by transportation managers both 
within 3M and outside the company because he was not conversant 
with the galaxy of regulatory details. At that time, traffic managers 
were often thought to be highly specialized “technocrats" who 
could fathom the inexplicable rules and regulations issued by the 
ICC and CAB. Transportation executives were typically thought to 
be unimaginative — dull - people, because the federal government 
quashed almost every attempt at inspired solutions to distribution 
problems. Therefore, the conventional wisdom was that innovative 
people would not stay in transportation, because their initiative 
would be constantly thwarted by federal regulations and rulings.2
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Mayeske observed:
In the regulated days it was almost a case that 
the shipper or transportation person would say 
to the rest of the company: "This aspect of the 
business is very complicated -- you couldn't begin 
to understand it, so you just come and ask me a 
question and I'll tell you whether you can do it 
or you can't do it."3
TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT AFTER DEREGULATION
Deregulation has drastically transformed the traffic management 
function. Today, traffic managers can negotiate almost any aspect of 
their relationship with carriers. Rates, service levels, and loss and 
damage claims are examples of factors that can now be negotiated.
It is no exaggeration to say that if a traffic manager in 1974 was 
accidentally hit on the head and went into a comma for the next 15 
years, and then awoke in 1989 -- he or she would literally be 
dumbfounded by the changes that had taken place. Bob Delaney, a 
transportation management consultant with Arthur D. Little, Inc., 
captured the magnitude of the alterations brought about by deregu­
lation, "Since deregulation, half of what I know is obsolete - the 
problem is knowing from day to day which half that is."4
Because traffic managers have many more options available to 
them now, their positions are becoming more complex. Richard G. 
Velten, director of transportation for Johnson and Johnson Hospital 
Services, noted that while some companies are decreasing their 
traffic management personnel because of corporate downsizing — 
which is also happening to every functional area — this should not 
be interpreted to indicate that the traffic function is perceived by 
senior managers to be of less importance. He observed:
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As far as the transportation professional's job 
diminishing, I think just the opposite. I think it's 
increasing. I think the transportation professional 
can provide more value-added services to a 
corporation than ever before because the capability 
has increased so dramatically, especially since 
deregulation.5
Roy Mayeske of 3M concurs with Velten. He stated, "Today we 
have to understand the objectives of the business and how we fit in 
enhancing it. You can't be a narrow specialist with tunnel vision 
anymore — you've got to see the broader picture."6 James R. Eaton, 
executive vice-president of Carolina Freight Carriers, believes that 
deregulation, with its release of regulatory constraints that formerly 
restricted imaginative solutions to distribution problems, has en­
hanced the importance of the traffic management function. He 
noted:
These people [traffic managers] now are more of 
a decision maker in their company than they used 
to be. When deregulation came upon us it put 
them in almost the same situation as purchasing 
agents. Purchasing agents in the old days had more 
clout than the traffic group. But today the traffic 
group has as much clout as the purchasing group 
because they really are purchasing now and they 
can get prices and tie in value ... They're more 
marketing oriented than they were.7
It should be noted that because of the substantial changes in the 
day-to-day operation of the traffic management position, some traffic 
managers were not able to adjust to the new environment.
Mr. Mayeske noted, "There were some people who fell by the 
wayside, couldn't cope, and left or moved into other aspects of the 
business."8
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The above suggests that the traffic management function has 
been substantially altered by deregulation. A survey was undertaken 
to determine specifically in what ways deregulation has changed the 
day-to-day activities of traffic managers.
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
A sample survey was conducted to identify traffic managers' 
overall level of job satisfaction and related opinions. The sampling 
frame consisted of all industrial companies represented in Value Line 
Investment Survey. After eliminating all companies in various service 
industries (e.g., air transport, banking, broadcast), an initial sample of 
500 firms was selected at random from among the remaining 
industrial concerns.
A questionnaire was then sent to the "Corporate/General Traffic 
Manager" in each company along with a cover letter explaining the 
nature of the study and requesting the respondent's cooperation. 
Although the budget for the survey precluded any additional follow­
up contact, a total of 215 traffic managers responded to the survey, 
representing a response rate of 43 percent Given that there are an 
estimated 1,200 industrial firms included in Value Line, a sample of 
215 traffic managers offers a margin of error of no more than plus or 
minus six percent at the 95 percent confidence level. Thus, all cited 
percentages are correct to within, at worst, ±6.0 percentage points. 
Indeed, as reported percentages depart from 50% in either direction, 
the actual margin of error decreases, dramatically so for percentages 
in the 20% or lower (80% or higher) range.
Exhibit 1 presents a graphical summary of these 215 traffic 
managers and their companies. Reflecting the composition of firms 
in Value Line Investment Survey, the companies represented in the 
sample tended to be rather large. Indeed, from Exhibit 1, nearly 
two-thirds (65.6%) of them have annual sales over $500 million, and 
95.4% have annual sales over $100 million.
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EXHIBIT 1
RESPONDENT DEMOGRAPHICS
Percentage (times 100)
Despite the fact that the firms in the sample were mostly large 
ones, the traffic managers themselves comprised a diverse group.
For example, the sizes of their staffs varied considerably. Just under 
half (44.0%) of the managers had at least eight people reporting 
while, at the other end, one in four (25.0%) managers had fewer 
than three people reporting.
The traffic managers in the survey also differed by educational 
background. While most of them (92.2%) had at least some college 
background, just six in ten (61.8%) had college degrees or better, 
and fewer than one in five (17.1 %) had a graduate degree.
Regarding age and experience, the majority (66.2%) of the traffic 
managers were between 30 and 50 years old, and another 28.6% 
were over 50. Very few (5.2%) were under 30. Similarly, almost 
three-fourths (70.4%) of them had at least eleven years experience in 
the transportation field, and half of those had over twenty years 
experience.
Finally, while the profession is still predominantly male, it is 
interesting that nearly ten percent (8.0%) of the traffic managers 
surveyed were women.
DEREGULATION'S IMPACT ON TRAFFIC MANAGERS
Each respondent was asked, "Flas deregulation of transportation 
made your job: much more challenging, more challenging, less 
challenging or much less challenging." Almost half of the traffic 
managers [46.9%] answered "much more challenging" and an even 
higher percentage [47.5%] selected "more challenging." Finally, 
5.6% of the traffic managers selected "less challenging." In addition, 
each respondent was asked to elaborate, using his/her own words, 
WHY they had selected the answer they did.
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Because almost 95% of the respondents found their positions 
either much more challenging or more challenging, we have com­
bined their comments. It was found upon analysis of these 203 
comments, five general categories of answers emerged-from the 
respondents' comments. These five general reasons accounted for 
187 of the 203 statements. The remaining 16 comments were only 
mentioned once or twice and are not included in the analysis. Each 
of the five main factors that have rendered the traffic management 
position more challenging will be discussed in the decreasing order 
of frequency that they were mentioned. (Please note that in a few 
cases it was difficult to categorize the respondent's answers because 
their comments overlapped more than one point. In these cases, 
the response was categorized by the factor which the respondent 
seemed to be emphasizing.)
BECAUSE THERE ARE MORE OPTIONS AVAILABLE,
THE JOB IS NOW MORE COMPLEX
Fifty-six respondents |26.0%l noted that as a result of deregula­
tion, there has been an influx of new carriers and there are addi­
tional options available from existing carriers. The result is that there 
are many new alternatives and variations available to traffic manag­
ers compared to when the government tightly controlled the 
transportation industry. Here is a sample of verbatim statements 
from respondents explaining the new transportation environment.
* Deregulation has completely changed the game.
There is so much variety available that I'm only 
limited by my imagination.
* Pricing of carrier services is more complex because 
each carrier can tailor make a rate/service package 
for us. Carrier bankruptcies have also further 
complicated my life. Finally, price stability is a thing 
of the past, which makes transportation cost fore­
casting almost impossible.
34 Journal of Transportation Management
* There are so many more transportation companies 
available compared to before deregulation. I could 
spend every minute hunting and negotiating rates, 
verifying their insurance and financial condition, etc.
I used to complain that the federal government held 
this industry in a straight jacket, but as I look back at 
it, at least it sure was an orderly situation compared 
to the chaos of today.
* Many new options, many different rates, less federal 
government rules and regulations means that there 
are many new rules of the game. My job has 
definitely become more complex as a result of 
deregulation. However, please note that I'm not 
complaining because like any other situation, I'm 
progressing rapidly on the learning curve.
* The new options available to us -- new carriers and 
the ability to negotiate rates and service levels - have 
allowed the traffic function to become a significant 
player in the corporate race to increase productivity. 
Many of the new carriers require research on my part 
to make sure that they will not fail and are capable of 
providing the service levels they say they can. I really 
enjoy the myriad of new options available to me. My 
position is much more difficult than it used to be, but 
also much more interesting. I really believe I can make 
a difference compared to the old days when the real 
challenge was to interpret government regulations.
* Today I have more options to select from in terms 
of service availability, more vendors to select from, 
and the ability to be involved with price and service 
negotiations. These are all positive opportunities, but 
there is also the potential problem of bigger screw-ups 
because we are working with more carriers for which 
we have less prior knowledge.
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• This industry is in a constant state of flux. At first I 
found it exhilarating, today I wish it were a little 
more predictable. Before deregulation this position 
was too dull, today it is too exciting. I wish we 
could find a happy middle-position.
TRAFFIC MANAGERS CAN BE INNOVATIVE AND CREATIVE
The second and third most commonly noted responses were 
each noted by 52 respondents [24.2%]. One was that because of 
deregulation, traffic managers now have the ability to be as innova­
tive and creative as other functional areas in the company. Prior to 
deregulation, the ICC and CAB basically controlled innovation and 
these government agencies were inclined to move at glacial speeds 
when it came to authorizing innovative rates and services. Today, 
traffic managers have almost no restrictions in terms of finding the 
most innovative and creative solutions to distribution problems. 
Below are typical statements from respondents.
• The handcuffs have been removed! "If it is to be, 
it's up to me." In other words, deregulation has 
enabled transportation to become more involved 
in the management process and our function can 
become proactive in meeting corporate goals.
• It has allowed me to be more entrepreneurial in my 
personal approach to solving problems. The other 
side of the coin is that there is more risk for me to 
make errors and have to live with the consequences.
• Transportation is now a purchased service and no 
longer exists in a static environment. Today we can 
structure a program with a carrier that really meets 
my company's needs, as opposed to accepting what 
the carrier has to offer. Creativity is limitless.
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* We now "purchase" transportation in a real 
competitive environment -- not just "account" 
for it as in the past.
* Rate and service levels are now an "open book."
A traffic manager today must be much more aware 
of the constant changes and innovations that are 
taking place in the transportation industry. I tend 
to think I am a relatively creative person, but I must 
confess I frequently talk to friends who have similar 
positions to mine in different companies and I am 
constantly amazed at some of the creative solutions 
they have come up with. My traffic department is 
slowly but surely losing the image that we are strictly 
technicians who completely lack creativity.
* The transportation industry should have been part 
of the free enterprise system a long time ago -- the 
challenge now is to find the best for the least!
* I am now able to exercise control over my destiny 
rather than be an interpreter of government regulations.
NEGOTIATION OF RATES AND SERVICES IS NOW 
A MANDATORY SKILL
The ability to successfully negotiate rate and service packages 
was also mentioned 52 times by respondents (24.2%). Traffic 
managers in the first years after deregulation noted that while, this 
skill was essential, they often found it frustrating to learn.9 Now, 
however, respondents stated that they enjoy this new aspect of their 
positions. Here are representative comments.
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* Deregulation has made negotiating a regular part 
of my job. It has become very interesting to see 
which carriers are willing to do their homework so 
they can determine their cost structure and hence 
how low their rates can go.
* I must do my homework when it comes to 
negotiating and I have to have a better general 
understanding of transportation costs and the 
industry in general.
* The sky's the limit when negotiating with carriers 
as far as rate structures and service and additional 
contract terms, such as penalties for noncompliance, 
rewards for superior service, etc.
* Deregulation has allowed freedom to negotiate 
transportation service contracts that are specifically 
designed to meet the exact needs of my company. 
As I look back over the years, I wonder why this 
didn't take place years ago!
* Deregulation has given us the opportunity to 
negotiate rates with carriers, and I believe it has 
made the carriers more responsive to shipper 
needs. Transit times are much better now than 
before deregulation.
* After deregulation in 1980, I have the ability to 
deal directly with carriers on a one-to-one basis.
This makes my job more challenging as well
as more exciting.
* Negotiations are fun. Rates are now freely 
negotiated where in the past they were "locked-in."
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TRAFFIC MANAGERS ARE LESS "TECHNOCRATS" AND 
MORE LIKE OTHER MANAGERS
Sixteen traffic managers [7.4%] stated that what made their 
positions more challenging was that with less governmental rules and 
regulations, they were able to become less "technocrats" and more 
like other managers in the company. Here are respondent quotes 
expressing their pleasure at being liberated from excessive govern­
mental rules and regulations.
* The free enterprise system can now be found
in transportation versus the old system of lethargy.
I no longer have the primary goal of complying with 
all the governmental rules and regulations.
* Regulations no longer make everything "set," what 
you now get out of the transportation system is up 
to you.
* It has given me personal control and allowed the 
rule books to gather dust. I feel the regulation era 
was a wonderful time to learn about transportation 
because it was such a protected environment. In 
the old days I couldn't really make a mistake relative 
to a competitor because they were subject to exactly 
the same tariffs I was.
* I have the opportunity to negotiate various aspects 
of the transportation contract in a business-like 
manner instead of the old bureaucratic, uniform 
procedure. My contribution to the success of my 
company is the result of a real effort on my part
that would not have been possible before deregulation.
* My managerial talents are no longer infringed upon 
by antiquated regulations.
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TRAFFIC MANAGERS MUST INVESTIGATE 
CARRIER'S BACKGROUND
The last factor mentioned with some frequency was that 
because of the tremendous influx of new -- often underfinanced — 
carriers, many of them operate in precarious financial condition. 
The problem is that if a carrier goes bankrupt when it possesses the 
shipper's freight, a complete breakdown of customer service stan­
dards takes place and the traffic department is castigated by the 
firm's marketing department. To prevent this situation, the traffic 
manager must become an amateur "Sherlock Holmes" in terms of 
doing research to ensure that the carrier being utilized is not on the 
brink of financial collapse. Here are typical statements from the 
eleven traffic managers (5.1 %] that discussed this problem.
* Deregulation has brought about many new 
opportunities to save my company money.
Also, deregulation has brought about the demise 
of many carriers. I have to be much more 
selective and careful about which carriers we 
use in terms of financial stability, insurance 
requirements, etc.
* There is so much price competition today that 
we almost have too much of a good thing. I 
really have to be careful when a carrier offers 
me an outstanding package that they can stand 
behind it and perform.
* Price competition is so severe that many previously 
sound companies have failed in recent years. Also, 
thousands of new companies have entered the TL 
market While I enjoy the new options available,
I must conscientiously check each carrier's back­
ground to make sure they won't go "belly-up" 
with my freight frozen in their system.
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• Managing the efficient, timely and economical 
movement involves much more than previously 
during regulation. There are many more choices. 
Price is the biggest issue, however, carrier financial 
strength, which was never an issue with regulation, 
is now an important part of the selection process.
THE CONTRARIAN'S POINT-OF-VIEW
Finally, it should be noted that twelve traffic managers [5.6%] 
stated that in their judgment transportation deregulation had made 
their positions “less challenging." Ironically, there is some logic to 
what the respondents were saying. Here are illustrative statements.
• In recent years I have been recognized by senior 
management for my ability to drastically decrease 
transportation rates while also providing improved 
ontime delivery schedules. What top management 
doesn't know, and I'm not going to tell them, is 
that I had next to nothing to do with these 
improvements. The transportation market is now 
so competitive that these changes took place 
automatically and I was the benefactor.
• Carriers compete with themselves so vigorously 
that rate negotiations are a breeze. This job is 
easier today than ever before.
• It's easy to look good when the environment 
is changing — which I can't control — and the 
result is that what I'm judged on, rates and 
service levels, are drastically improving. This job 
is less demanding because carriers are competing 
so aggressively for my tonnage.
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CONCLUSION
The traffic management function has been significantly - and 
irrevocably — changed as a result of transportation deregulation. 
Nineteen of every twenty traffic managers surveyed stated that 
deregulation had made their positions either "much more challeng­
ing" or "more challenging." They indicated that there were five 
major factors (see Exhibit 2) that have substantially changed as a 
result of deregulation, with the most common reason being that the 
traffic management position is now much more complex because 
there are so many more shipping options available. Finally, a few 
traffic managers stated that deregulation had actually made their 
positions easier, since they were credited for cost reductions and/or 
improved service levels that resulted from deregulation.
Transportation deregulation, more than any other factor in the 
history of traffic management, will be seen by future transportation 
historians as the most important single event that liberated traffic 
managers from being "technocrats." While technocrats are essential 
managers, their skills are typically so narrowly focused that they are 
perceived by senior management to be incapable of being promoted 
to positions of greater responsibility requiring more generalized 
management skills. Today's successful traffic manager must be a 
generalist. To be effective, they must be analytical in their abilities to 
study problems and implement creative solutions. This typically 
involves negotiating with carriers so that "win-win" solutions are 
created in which both the carrier and the shipper benefit from the 
negotiated rate/service agreement. Traffic managers are now ideally 
situated to be promoted to positions of increasing responsibility. 
Why? Because they can clearly demonstrate to senior management 
the improvements they have achieved regarding increased customer 
service levels and/or freight rate reductions. These achievements 
will propel them into positions of greater responsibility both in 
logistics and marketing. We foresee the day when former traffic 
managers regularly compete for top management positions.
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EXHIBIT 2
REASONS WHY TRAFFIC MANAGERS BELIEVE THEIR JOB IS MORE 
CHALLENGING SINCE TRANSPORTATION DEREGULATION
Job Is Now More Complex Because There 
Are More Shipping Options
Traffic Managers Can Now Be More 
Innovative and Creative
Negotiation of Rates and Services Is Now a 
Mandatory Skill
Traffic Managers Are Now Less "Technocrats 
and More Like Other Managers
Traffic Managers Must Investigate Carrier's 
Background
Miscellaneous Reasons
•Note: The percentages in this chart do not sum to 100% 
because 5.6% of respondents stated that transportation 
deregulation had made their job less challenging.
26.0%
24.2%
24.2%
PERCENT
A precautionary note is advisable regarding the relatively few 
traffic managers that stated that their positions had become easier 
because of deregulation. They noted that deregulation had made 
the entire transportation industry so much more competitive, that 
they looked highly competent because service levels had substan­
tially improved and rates had often drastically decreased. These 
managers stated that these changes took place, not because they 
were such effective traffic managers, but because the entire industry 
was now so much more competitive. Therefore, they appeared very 
efficient when, in fact, they were often not directly responsible for 
the improvements. This situation is changing. In both the trucking 
and air freight industries, rates have finally bottomed-out and in 
many situations and are starting to slowly increase. Clifford Sayre, 
director of logistics at DuPont Corporation, declared, "Demand has 
caught up with supply of certain types of freight transportation and 
rates are starting to move up" at a rate "close to or slightly more 
than the inflation rate."10 Robert Delaney, a transportation consult­
ant for Arthur D. Little, Inc., made a similar observation. "We've 
gotten all the benefits of deregulation in freight-cost reductions.
Now we are starting to see real freight rate increases as carriers 
replace equipment, pay higher fuel costs and pay more for labor. 
You'll see carriers try to recoup some of the price cutting that 
occurred previously."11 Therefore, traffic managers can no longer 
expect market conditions to be as favorable as they have been 
during the previous decade. Future improvements in service levels 
and rates will be harder to come by and will require skillful analysis 
and negotiation by traffic managers.
In conclusion, the traffic management function has been 
irreversibly altered as a result of deregulation. Undoubtedly, traffic 
managers were apprehensive about the myriad of changes brought 
about by deregulation. They would have concurred with John 
Adams, who in 1 776 [he became president in 1797] wrote to his 
friend James Warren and stated, "All great changes are irksome to 
the human mind, especially those which are attended with great 
dangers and uncertain effects."12 Nevertheless, a decade after
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deregulation, traffic managers are not only coping with the new 
transportation environment, but it appears they are revelling in their 
new-found freedom from the straight-jacket of government rules and 
regulations. Traffic managers are now managers in the true sense of 
the word. Further they welcome this opportunity to prove them­
selves. To borrow a literary metaphor, deregulation has presented 
traffic managers with new mountains to climb. Based on the results 
of this survey, traffic managers are apparently well past "base camp" 
and, it would seem, very much enjoying this new set of challenges.
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STRATEGIC AIRLIFT: A CASUALTY OF DEREGULATION
by
Kent N. Gourdin
University of North Carolina at Charlotte
INTRODUCTION
In any society, logistics is the means for bridging the gap 
between the national economy and a planned military operation. 
However, in a democracy, logistics planning must compete with 
other national objectives for an equitable distribution of that soci­
ety's scarce resources. The share allocated to logistics must be 
effectively utilized to create and sustain military forces in support of 
National policies and objectives. Towards that goal, logistics is 
comprised of four principal processes: requirements determination, 
acquisition, distribution, and conservation. The suboptimization of 
one of these components can adversely effect the entire logistics 
function which would have severe consequences for the defense 
effort as a whole. In other words, it makes little sense to procure 
sophisticated equipment (acquisition), but lack the ability to expedi­
tiously move it to the front lines (distribution).1
This paper will focus on the transportation component of the 
distribution process, specifically addressing the contention that the 
U.S. commercial aviation sector is no longer capable of fulfilling its 
wartime mission. The implication is that, without a fully responsive 
contingency distribution system, the logistics element would be 
unable to support national defense objectives. Clearly, without 
logistics a sustained war cannot be fought, let alone won. In a broad 
sense, this article will examine the deteriorating linkage between 
civilian wartime transportation providers and users (the Department
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of Defense). Specific areas to be addressed include military trans­
portation, strategic airlift, and several peripheral concerns of impor­
tance.
MILITARY TRANSPORTATION
Transportation has historically been recognized as a critical 
factor in the success (or failure) of military campaigns. During the 
War of 1812, the United States incurred enormous costs associated 
with transporting men and material, due to inadequate facilities and 
transportation routes. In fact, the almost universal opinion at the 
time was that those facilities could have been built for what it cost to 
cope without them.2 Sokol notes that, once the situation has 
become stabilized, the logistics problem, primarily one of transporta­
tion, becomes of primary concern.3 Similarly, General Douglas 
McArthur realized the importance of establishing and maintaining a 
viable logistical chain, stating that tactics can be decisively influenced 
by the means at hand for maneuvering, supplying, and controlling 
combat forces.4
Rather than investing in, and maintaining, transport resources 
necessary only for war, the U.S. policy has been to rely on the 
nation's commercial transportation industries to make their person­
nel and equipment available to the DOD should the need arise. This 
is in contrast to the Soviet Union, which maintains military airlift and 
sealift assets beyond those required to meet peacetime needs. The 
transport aircraft carry the livery of Aeroflot, the national airline, 
while the ships fly the flag of the merchant marine, but they are, in 
actuality, intended to satisfy contingency transport needs. In fact, 
our government has repeatedly turned to the civilian sector for its 
contingency transportation needs. Early in American history, the 
military practice was to contract with civilians for the provision of 
support functions such as transportation.5 With the outbreak of 
World War I, the nation found itself with a private rail network 
unable to meet wartime transport demands. In order to win that
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FIGURE 1. Air Transportation Policy Formulation & Implementation
conflict, the federal government took over the railroads in 1917 and 
ran the system until 1920.6 This linkage between defense and 
commercial transportation interests continues to exist today, and 
forms the foundation for much of our total wartime movement 
capability.
An important characteristic of this relationship is that the 
government has exerted very little influence over the equipment 
developed for, and operated by, transport companies. Rather, the 
DOD "makes do" with planes, ships, and vehicles operated by firms 
whose profit-driven needs may be significantly different from those 
of defense planners. As an example, two mechanized air cargo 
handling systems have evolved over the years, one developed by the 
military and one by the civilian air carriers. The two are partially, 
though not totally, compatible, a situation that could be extremely 
limiting in a contingency. However, a larger and more serious 
problem arises when the needs of the carriers no longer coincide 
with those of national defense. For example, one of the initial 
results of airline deregulation was that carriers began operating 
smaller airplanes over shorter routes, often replacing larger aircraft 
with these new fuel efficient aircraft. Unfortunately, these new 
planes were of little use to the DOD, which still required large, long- 
range aircraft. We will return to this commonality question later.
The formal institutional relationship between national security 
and air transportation goals is depicted in figure 1. Haefele notes 
that it is national purpose--as articulated and expanded in national 
goals--that determines the structure of supporting policies.7 Thus, 
the various cabinet Secretaries are concerned with establishing 
policies and objectives within their respective departments that will 
contribute to the attainment of the overall national objectives as 
specified by the President. However, the specification of national 
security goals also influences the development of transportation 
goals insofar as the nation's transport is expected to support the 
DOD. This may be, unfortunately, a one-way street While national 
transportation policy includes a commitment to meet the needs of
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national defense, defense policy is often developed with little regard 
for the availability of adequate transport resources. The result is that 
the transportation system must often react to, rather than evolve 
with, DOD policy since it is not until national transportation policy is 
implemented that the specific needs of one sector relative to the 
other are actively considered. The intended objective should be to 
utilize the nation's transportation resources so as to meet the needs 
of both. However, the actual results may be quite different, as the 
following example will readily illustrate.
Design on the Army's new Ml tank was begun in 1973. The full 
production run called for 7,058 vehicles to be manufactured at a 
unit cost of $2.68 million. It was not until mid-1981 that the Army 
rigorously addressed the transport problems inherent in the move­
ment of the 60 ton behemoth. The Pentagon noted that a standard 
rail car could only handle one Ml, so the proposed solution was to 
build 569 stronger, more expensive flatcars that could accommodate 
2 tanks each.8 Similarly, air transportation is constrained in that the 
C5 wide-body airlifter can only carry one vehicle, effectively limiting 
the weapon's usefulness as a part of a short-notice deployment
STRATEGIC AIRLIFT
The entire concept of strategic airlift (i.e. between the United 
States and overseas areas) was formulated with the start of World 
War II.9 Since the military had little long-range air transport experi­
ence, the domestic airline community was pressed into service to fill 
the void. Though operating under the auspices of the Army's Air 
Transport Command and the Naval Air Transport Service, the 
carriers used their own equipment, facilities, and personnel to 
provide the capability for long-haul, rapid movement of men and 
equipment so desperately needed. In essence, the airlines them­
selves built and operated the wartime strategic airlift organizations. 
Following the war, the Air Force's Military Air Transport Service 
(MATS) became the permanent strategic air movement arm of the
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United States military establishment. In 1965, MATS became the 
Military Airlift Command (MAC), which continues to perform as the 
single DOD manager for airlift. Strategic air movement is provided 
with an organic fleet of 96 C-5 wide-body aircraft, and 267 narrow- 
body C141 s.10
To augment this capability in time of war or national emergency, 
the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) Program was created in 1951, 
whereby civilian air carrier aircraft were identified by tail number 
and allocated for national defense at three levels of need which will 
be explained in detail later.11 There was, and still is, no legislative 
basis for the CRAF; its success depends upon the cooperation of the 
airline industry.12 To foster that spirit of voluntary participation, as 
well as to familiarize civil carriers with the handling of military 
passengers and cargo, MAC awards yearly contracts to CRAF partici­
pants for the provision of international air services. For Fiscal Year 
(FY) 89, $310 million worth of airlift will be provided for MAC by 
commercial carriers,13 The CRAF as of August 1989 is depicted in 
Table 1. (It is worth noting that the exact size and composition of 
the CRAF fluctuates from month to month as carriers add and drop 
aircraft due to maintenance, sales, or equipment acquisitions.) By 
far the largest and most important portion of the CRAF is the Long- 
Range International Segment, consisting of 400 aircraft. This is the 
element that supports MAC strategic operations, and necessitates the 
use of aircraft capable of extended overwater operations with a 
productive payload.
Participation in the CRAF involves a commitment on the part of 
the carriers to respond to varying emergency situations incremen­
tally, based on three levels of urgency. Stage I may be employed by 
the Commander-In-Chief of MAC (CINCMAC) to maintain cargo and 
passenger backlogs at MAC air bases within acceptable limits.
Carriers have 24 hours to make an aircraft available for missions.
- Stage II includes those airplanes in Stage I, and is for expanded airlift, 
approved for use by the Secretary of Defense in providing capability 
for a contingency not warranting a declaration of national emer-
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TABLE 1
CIVIL RESERVE AIR FLEET (CRAF)
Aircraft Allocated A$ of August 1989
Domestic Segment (39)
B727
DC-9
L-188
L-100
Alaskan Segment (7)
L-100
L-188
DC-6
Short-Range International Segment (30)
B-737
B-727
B-757
Long-Range International Segment (400) 
Passenger (271)
DC-8/B-707 20
B-747 109
DC-10 57
L-1011 38
B-767/A310 47
8
3
11
17
3
2
2
4 
21
5
+
Cargo (129)
51 71
+ 52 161
+ 26 83
-1- 0 38
+ 0 47
(Source: MAC HQ Form 312, Monthly Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) 
Capability Summary, 1 August 89
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TABLE 2
CARRIERS PARTICIPATING IN THE CIVIL RESERVE AIR FLEET
As of August 1989
Domestic Segment
Evergreen International 
Southern Air Transoport 
TPI International 
Zantop
Alaskan Segment
Markair
Northern Air Cargo 
Reeve
Short-Range International Segment
Aloha
Eastern
Transocean
Joint Venture 1: Key/American Trans Air 
Long-Range International Segment
American Pan American
Continental Southern Air Transport*
Delta TWA
Hawaiian United*
Northwest*
Joint Venture 2:
Joint Venture 1: World
Flying Tiger* Rosenbalm*
Tower American
UPS* Evergreen*
United Emery*
Joint Venture 3: Joint Venture 4:
Northwest* Pan American
Federal Express Evergreen*
Tower
Joint Venture 5:
Pan American Joint Venture 6:
American Pan American*
Connie Kalitta* American Trans Air 
Connie Kalitta*
Joint Venture 7:
Rosenbalm*
CF Air Freight*
•Airlines providing cargo aircraft
(Source: MAC HQ Form 312, Monthly Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) Capability 
Summary, 1 August 89
gency. As in Stage I, carriers have 24 hours to make an aircraft avail­
able. Stage III may be implemented by the Secretary of Defense, 
only after a national emergency is declared by the President or 
Congress. Carriers have 48 hours to respond to his call, which 
results in the commitment of all long-range cargo aircraft Even 
though Stage III utilizes all CRAF line-haul resources, it is still not 
sufficient to meet wartime air cargo requirements, a shortcoming 
that will be discussed in more detail later.14 Carriers participating in 
the CRAF as of August 1989 are shown in Table 2.
Presently, the U.S. wartime airlift requirement for military cargo 
is 66 million ton miles (MTM)/day, a figure that takes account of our 
sealift capability and - the prepositioning of equipment at various 
overseas locations. MAC organic aircraft (C-141/C-5) will provide 
32.7 MTM/day capability, while the KC-10 (an aerial tanker/transport 
based on the commercial DC-10) will generate an additional 4.5 
MTM/day of military airlift15 A Stage III CRAF activation would result 
in approximately 16 MTM/day capability, based on the CRAF compo­
sition in August 1989.16 Thus, out of the 66 million ton miles/day 
that must be moved in wartime, the U.S. can, at best, hope to 
support only 53 million ton miles/day in the foreseeable future, 
leaving a 13 million ton miles/day shortfall.
The shortage of required airlift was discussed earlier. Of critical 
importance is the fact that this shortfall is exacerbated by a CRAF 
now subject to the vagaries of the free market Deregulation of the 
airline industry led to a dramatic increase in air carrier competition. 
Coincidentally, costs (particularly for fuel) were rising while the 
nation's economy faltered and fewer people travelled by air. The 
airlines moved to adopt hub-and-spoke systems serviced by smaller 
aircraft; carriers like Pan Am, United, and American abandoned all­
cargo service and sold off their freighter aircraft; new carriers 
entered the industry, squeezing profits still further and, in some 
cases, failing quickly. Complicating the situation for our interna­
tional airlines was the fact that, while we had deregulated our 
commercial air industry, the rest of the world had not. Thus, U.S.
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airlines faced the added burden of having to compete with overseas 
carriers owned or largely controlled by their respective governments, 
and, in many cases, operated for reasons other than profit. The 
result was a decade of upheaval in the air carrier industry that 
directly impacted the Long-Range International segment of the CRAF 
as well. The smaller airplanes being adopted by the carriers were 
not suitable for long-haul overwater transportation, and, in fact, 
were replacing older aircraft that could fulfill that mission. Braniff 
International went bankrupt in 1981; Flying Tigers came perilously 
close to following suit in 1986; and Pan American, after losing $72.7 
million in 1988 (its 11 th moneylosing year out of the past 1 7),17 is 
now actively seeking some sort of merger partner.18
The 1980's saw other developments of importance to the CRAF. 
In 1983 the Air Force implemented the CRAF Enhancement Program 
whereby convertibility features could be retrofitted (at government 
expense) to existing passenger airplanes that would allow them to 
transport military cargo in time of war. Of the 19 B747s committed 
to the program, 15 have been modified as of late 1988.19 Another 
DOD effort to address the declining number of long-range airliners in 
the CRAF took the form of a joint venture (JV) Program initiated by 
MAC in 1986. The intent of the program was to bolster the CRAF by 
bringing in operators and/or carriers previously excluded from par­
ticipating. Should the need arise, aircraft and crews from the joint 
venture firms would be pooled and utilized as though they were 
being supplied by a single entity.20 This enabled MAC to utilize the 
significant cargo fleets of companies such as UPS and Emery, some­
thing it had not been able to do before. Finally, growing concern 
about the increasing age of the airliner fleet led foreign and domestic 
carriers to embark on an unprecedented aircraft buying spree.
Boeing received orders for 636 aircraft valued at $30.1 billion in 
1988,21 while McDonnell-Douglas logged $15.6 billion infirm 
backlogs for the year.22 Of importance to this discussion is the fact 
that included in those figures were firm orders for 1 72 B747-40023 
and 103 MD-11 wide-body transports.24
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However, whether or not the CRAF will benefit by these devel­
opments is uncertain. While the CRAF Enhancement Program 
resulted in the addition of valuable wartime cargo-carrying capabil­
ity, Pan Am was the only carrier willing to participate. Thus, there is 
no ongoing stream of existing aircraft being modified; in fact, the 
B747 lost over Scotland in December of 1988 was a CRAF enhanced 
plane. The airline was contemplating putting twelve more aircraft 
through the program, but the revenue capacity eliminated as a result 
of the accident may necessitate postponement of that decision.25 
Another area of concern centers around the wartime management 
of the CRAF and its various component parts. A full-scale activation 
would involve coordinating the efforts of 29 airlines and eight joint 
ventures. Of the seven long-range international segment joint 
ventures shown earlier in Table 2, three are made up of three 
carriers each, while two more are comprised of four and five carriers 
respectively. Notification procedures alone would to be daunting; 
while the task of providing ongoing leadership in a contingency 
environment would appear to be virtually impossible. Finally, the 
growth in wide-body aircraft orders is a mixed blessing. For the first 
time in over a decade, U.S. airlines are committing to wide-body 
long range jets in appreciable numbers. American Airlines, for 
instance, recently ordered eight MD-11s and optioned 42 more,26 
while Delta ordered nine and optioned 31,27 But these are all 
passenger versions that will provide no cargo carrying capability even 
if they do eventually find their way into the CRAF. Furthermore, tax 
law changes have combined with airline consolidations and mercu­
rial market conditions to force a shift in transport aircraft purchasing 
and ownership patterns. Carriers are finding short-term leases (i.e. 5 
years) an increasingly attractive alternative to ownership.28 In fact, 
30% of the U.S. commercial fleet is now leased, and that figure 
could increase to 60-70% in the next decade.29 This gives the 
airlines tremendous flexibility to change aircraft types in response to 
competition and market opportunities, and eliminates the large 
capital costs associated with purchasing their own aircraft. However, 
one of the largest leasing companies in the world is CPA Group Ltd, 
which is an Irish firm.30 This raises the specter of a further decline in
Volume 2, Number I 57
the CRAF, since foreign-owned aircraft are excluded from participat­
ing. In addition, the flexibility inherent in the leasing option will 
work against the fleet stability so essential to the CRAF. Programs like 
CRAF Enhancement are predicated upon maintaining the modified 
aircraft in the U.S. fleet for considerably longer than five years.
The preceding discussion has served to illustrate a crucial fact: 
the needs of the airlines no longer parallel those of national defense. 
This is not, necessarily bad. However, there is no mechanism in 
place to insure the maintenance of that industry/government linkage 
forged during, and after, World War II. Indeed, we can't even 
“draft” the carriers as we did then because their emphasis on 
smaller aircraft makes that proposition of limited value. Thus, it is 
that missing link that is the crux of the problem. The Airline Deregu­
lation Act of 1978 makes essentially no mention of national defense, 
retaining the position underlying previous aviation legislation that a 
sound commercial air transport system would insure an adequate 
reserve of airlift capability in the event of war. Thus, it would be 
inaccurate to say that deregulation, in and of itself, placed the CRAF 
in jeopardy. Rather, the move away from economic regulation 
graphically illustrated that airline interests and defense transport 
interests may not, for whatever reason, coincide. The implication is, 
then, that in the absence of some mechanism to insure defense 
transport needs are met, managerial responses to future environ­
mental developments (advanced aircraft technology, noise and 
pollution concerns, further market changes) could prove just as 
detrimental to wartime airlift capability as deregulation has today.
Unfortunately, policy makers have not handled this divergence 
very well. The perception is that the best way for the government to 
foster support for the CRAF is within the confines of the free market, 
as opposed to some sorts of more direct action that will delineated 
later. Thus, after ten years of trying to negotiate the CRAF Enhance­
ment Program, the end result was the large-scale participation of 
only one carrier. Similarly, the almost inescapable conclusion is that 
the Joint Venture program would, if implemented, prove to be an
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administrative and logistical nightmare. Finally, after almost four 
decades, airline participation in the CRAF is still voluntary. In sum, 
MAC and the DOD seem content to react to environmental changes 
after they occur, rather than pushing for a more proactive approach 
that does not rely solely on the vagaries of the free market
PERIPHERAL ISSUES
It is important to realize that the use of civil air transport re­
sources for military purposes is, at best, a compromise. The C141 
and the C5 were specifically designed to carry cargo and are charac­
terized by a high wing design; that is, the fuselage is suspended from 
the wing. This places the cargo compartment close to the ground, 
and provides the drive on/drive off capability so essential to the mass 
movement of wheeled equipment. The civilian air cargo industry on 
the other hand uses aircraft that are derivatives of passenger planes. 
The B747, the DC10, the B707 and the DC8 were not designed for 
freight transportation. They have a low wing design which places 
the fuselage above the wing, effectively eliminating any possibility for 
drive on/drive off vehicle handling. In addition, the two systems 
each utilize cargo pallets that are fundamentally different in design. 
Those used by the military measure 88 inches by 108 inches, while 
civilian pallets are either 88 or 96 inches by 125 inches.
Shipping military cargo aboard civil airliners presents some 
unique problems, even in peacetime. Military aircraft and materials 
handling equipment (MHE) are designed to handle DOD pallets 
widthwise (i.e. the long edge is perpendicular to the aircraft's line of 
flight). Narrow body airliners, as well as the DC10, are loaded from 
the side, which means the pallets must first be placed into the CRAF 
airplane, then manually spun 90 degrees before they are pushed 
down the fuselage. On those B747s designed for loading through 
the nose, the pallets must enter the aircraft lengthwise (i.e. the long 
edge parallel to the line of flight). Hence, they all must be turned 90 
degrees before they are put onto the loader. When this is done,
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military loading vehicles can carry only four pallets versus the five for 
which they are designed. It is worth noting here that, while military 
pallets can be transported on civilian airplanes, commercial pallets 
and containers are virtually unusable on military aircraft. The rail 
and locking systems aboard civilian aircraft can be adjusted to 
accommodate both types of pallets, while military planes can only 
accept Air Force pallets. Unfortunately, when airliners are used to 
transport military cargo, suboptimal aircraft utilization can result 
from the smaller size and reduced load bearing strength of DOD 
pallets relative to airline pallets
Another problem is that extremely large pieces of cargo, 
particularly rolling stock, are very difficult to handle via civilian 
aircraft. When utilizing sideloading planes, they payload has to be 
small enough and/or maneuverable enough to make the 90 degree 
turn from the loader into the fuselage. In addition, the narrow cabin 
of the DC8 or the B707 effectively limits the size and shape of the 
shipment, as does the nose opening in the wide body. Finally, the 
lack of a drive-in/drive-off capability proves to be a very limiting 
factor, especially in the context of a wartime scenario. Of equal 
concern is that military and civil loaders are basically restricted to 
servicing their respective aircraft. That is, Air Force loading vehicles 
were designed to handle aircraft having a cargo floor essentially at 
truckbed height above the ground. While this equipment can also 
service narrow-body airliners, it, cannot interface directly with wide- 
body Freighters. An elevator of commercial design must be utilized 
as a bridge between the aircraft and the loader; the plane simply 
cannot be worked without it. Similarly, civilian loading equipment is 
intended for use on aircraft having a cargo compartment that is ten 
to fifteen feet above the ground. The cab is generally designed to fit 
under the fuselage, something the low-slung military transport 
aircraft does not allow.
The inescapable conclusion is that military and civilian cargo 
handling systems are fundamentally incompatible. The two function 
together in peacetime because there is sufficient time to overcome
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the constraints delineated earlier. But in a contingency situation 
those limitations could prove crippling. Essentially, military pallets 
and materials handling resources will be tasked to fulfill all wartime 
requirements because of the incompatibilities previously mentioned. 
Limitations on the type and size of cargo that can be moved aboard 
civilian aircraft would necessitate a horrendous scheduling effort 
intended to insure that aircraft and cargo are matched correctly.
The commercial elevator required for wide-body loading/unloading 
is an obvious weakness since those aircraft cannot be serviced 
without it Although MAC has prepositioned 116 of these elevators 
throughout the airlift system,31 there is no guarantee that commercial 
cargo missions will be, or can be, limited to those fields having an 
elevator on station. Finally, the lack of a drive-on/drive-off capability 
severely limits the effectiveness of civil airliners in a contingency 
situation.
RECOMMENDATIONS
It is absolutely imperative that the nation's air transport re­
sources become more responsive to the needs of national defense. 
One long range solution to the airlift problem would be for both 
MAC and the airlines to fly the same type of airplanes in the future. 
This could lower the per plane cost to each group, and would 
provide for a common cargo handling system while insuring a steady 
growth in usable CRAF capability. Of course, the introduction of the 
new C-17 widebody military transport (like the C-141 and C-5, also 
a high-wing design) in the mid 1990s will go a long way towards 
eliminating the airlift shortfall discussed earlier. But it will do 
nothing to address the deteriorating condition of the CRAF. Similarly, 
MAC has been working for years to put together a NATO "CRAF" 
comprised of suitable aircraft from nations belonging to that alliance, 
with little success. In truth, such a show of unity from countries of 
widely, disparate cultures and ideologies seems doubtful. Another, 
more immediate, alternative may be to capitalize on the renewed 
interest being shown by US airlines in wide-body planes, and CRAF
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enhance all long range passenger aircraft before they come off the 
assembly line. This would keep modification costs down, and would 
provide a flow of contingency capability into the civil fleet Admit­
tedly, the carriers might have some reservations about the effect of 
the increased weight on aircraft's productive range, but the impact 
of this could perhaps be minimized through some sort of abbrevi­
ated enhancement package that would limit the wartime cargo 
payload slightly in exchange for reduced structural strengthening.
From the standpoint of military airlift alone, the first solution 
delineated above is the preferred one since it dramatically increases 
not only capacity, but much needed drive-on/drive-off capability. 
Unfortunately, the cost of this option is tremendous, and it does little 
to address the ongoing health of the CRAF. Rather, the third alterna­
tive seems the smarter choice. By enhancing new civil aircraft, 
increased contingency airlift can be obtained at a reasonable per- 
plane cost. While these airplanes could not provide drive-on/drive- 
off flexibility of their military counterparts, perhaps bulky vehicles 
and other large cargo could be earmarked for MAC. Alternatively, 
funds could be spent to develop loading equipment that would 
allow roll-on/roll-off loading and unloading of civil aircraft At any 
rate, a continuous CRAF enhancement program sensitive to the 
revenue needs of the carriers, seems to offer the most promise for 
sustained CRAF growth.
CONCLUSIONS
Prior to 1978, the moods of the DOD tended to coincide nicely 
with those of the airlines. The latter wanted bigger, faster, longer- 
range aircraft, which was exactly what the former desired. The 
airlines could afford to buy those aircraft and were, by and large, 
perfectly willing to commit them to the CRAF. But while their 
collective enthusiasm for the CRAF remains just as strong today, the 
realities of the free market have made them less able to participate.
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MAC approached one large US carrier several years ago, requesting 
that several new B747s be CRAF enhanced while still on the assem­
bly line. The airline declined, citing range/payload penalties result­
ing from the weight of the modifications that would have rendered 
them less competitive over their long-haul routes. To put it bluntly, 
we simply do not have the means to rapidly transport the men and 
equipment needed to support DOD contingency plans. This, in turn, 
places the entire logistics effort at risk, a situation with grave implica­
tions for the nation's defense posture. Recall that the purpose of 
logistics is to create and sustain military forces to support national 
policy and objectives. Unless the relationship between the industrial 
providers and government users of air transportation is redefined to 
reflect the changing needs of both, America's strategic airlift capabil­
ity will become a casualty of deregulation. The loss of such an 
important national resource must not be allowed to happen.
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"AN INSIDE LOOK AT DELTA NU ALPHA MEMBERSHIP"
by
Roger E. Jerman and Ronald D. Anderson 
Indiana University School of Business
INTRODUCTION
Delta Nu Alpha is one of the largest fraternities for persons in 
the traffic, transportation, and logistics industry. Delta Nu Alpha was 
founded in 1940 to facilitate and promote greater knowledge of 
traffic and transportation, to develop an appreciation of the traffic 
profession as a motivating factor in industry and commerce, and to 
encourage young persons of ability to enter and remain in the field 
as a life's work.
The purpose of this report is to provide demographics, statistical 
characteristics, and professional viewpoints of the 1988 membership 
of Delta Nu Alpha. Specifically, the objectives are to:
1. Summarize professional characteristics and develop 
comparisons with a similar 1976 study,
2. Summarize salary levels by management position and 
level of decision-making responsibility,
3. Analyze the impact of deregulation on perceptions 
of stress and prestige,
4. Summarize the preferences for decentralized 
salesmarketing functions, centralized shipper traffic- 
distribution functions, and national accounts selling,
5. Develop profiles of decision making styles.
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METHODOLOGY
In late Spring of 1988, 3,500 mail questionnaires were sent to a 
systematic sample drawn from a list of approximately 9,000 mem­
bers of Delta Nu Alpha. This resulted in 920 usable returns or a 
response rate of 26.3 percent. The survey was, in part, a replication 
of a 1976 survey which was the basis for a previously published 
report on Delta Nu Alpha.1 A single mailing of 2,000 questionnaires 
in 1976 to the then approximately 11,000 members of Delta Nu 
Alpha resulted in 664 usable returns for a response rate of 33.2 
percent
RESPONDENT CHARACTERISTICS
The mixture of carriers and shippers has remained relatively 
constant from 1976 to 1988, as shown in Table 1. However, the 
relative number of rail carriers has decreased four percent while 
motor carriers have grown eight percent. Manufacturing oriented 
shippers remain the overwhelming majority of shipper membership 
and grew by two percent Whereas, wholesaling oriented shipper 
grew by four percent, and retail oriented shippers lost one percent 
over the time period.
The most pronounced changes in the profiles from 1976 to 
1988 are shown by Table 2, which portrays changes in age, educa­
tion, and growth in female membership. The 1988 membership is 
significantly better educated than the 1976 membership. Further, 
approximately sixty-two percent of the 1988 respondents are under 
age forty-five, compared to fifty percent of the 1976 respondents 
under age forty-five. This implies that the major educational pro­
grams of Delta Nu Alpha can be geared to an increasingly sophisti­
cated audience. This also suggests that the organization is not 
plagued with an “aging fleet", and offers strong leadership potential 
for younger members.
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TABLE 1
BUSINESS COM POSTION: 1976 vs 1988
Carrier mode 1976 1988 Change
Motor 75% 83% 8%
Rail 16% 12% -4%
Other 9% 5% -4%
N 314 433
Business type 1976 1988 Change
Carrier 48% 47% -1%
Shipper 43% 43% 0%
Other 9% 10% 1%
N 664 920
Shipper business 1976 1988 Change
Manufacturing 76% 78% 2%
Wholesaling 7% 11% 4%
Retailing 7% 6% -1%
Other 10% 5% -5%
N 282 388
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TABLE 2
RESPONDENT CHARACTERISTICS: 1976 vs 1988
Age 1976 1988 Change
Under 35 26% 22% -4%
35-44 24% 40% 16%
45-54 33% 24% -9%
55-64 16% 13% -3%
65-Up 1% 1% 0%
N 649 811
Education 1976 1988 Change
High School 12% 8% -4%
Some College 47% 41% -6%
College Graduate 24% 32% 8%
Some Graduate Work 10% 13% 3%
Graduate Degree 7% 6% -1%
N 662 782
Sex 1976 1988 Change
Male 96% 75% -21%
Female 4% 25% 21%
N 654 782
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The most significant demographic change was the astounding 
growth of women membership. In 1976, there were hardly enough 
responding female members to count In 1988, twenty-five percent 
of the responding members were female. This is a whopping 
twenty-one percent growth. Delta Nu Alpha is to be commended 
for its successful recruitment of women members and also for getting 
them involved at the officer level. The future Delta Nu Alpha 
member will most likely come from the ranks of the college gradu­
ate. Since the present undergraduate School of Business programs 
have over fifty percent women enrollment, Delta Nu Alpha seems to 
be on the right strategic track for long term growth in recruiting the 
female segment for membership.
Transportation and distribution executives have long suffered 
from somewhat of an identity crisis. Part of this, no doubt, comes 
from the wide variety of job titles given very similar functional 
assignments. The most common position titles given by survey 
respondents are shown in Table 3. The levels of management 
responsibility indicated by the respondents are given in Table 4. 
These levels of responsibility will be used in the following sections in 
the analysis of perceptions of stress and prestige and decision making 
styles.
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TABLE 3
POSITION TITLES
Tide Carrier Shipper Other
President/Vice President 13% 2% 25%
Director of
Physical Distribution 13%
Terminal Manager 16%
Traffic Manager 53%
Other Middle Managers 8%
Sales Manager 15%
Sales Representative 34%
Transportation Analyst 11%
Other 14% 21% 75%
N 433 394 93
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TABLE 4
MANAGEMENT LEVEL
Level Rail Motor Shipper Other
Strategic 10% 17% 7% 12%
Tactical 58% 42% 73% 58%
Operations 32% 41% 20% 30%
N 50 355 384 789
PROFESSIONAL MEMBERSHIPS
Table 5 shows the absolute number and the percentage of the 
responding Delta Nu Alpha membership that belong to various other 
related professional organizations. The biggest overlap is with the 
American Society of Transportation and Logistics. A smaller percent 
of 1988 survey hold multiple professional memberships in compari­
son to the 1976 survey. This leads to speculation that companies 
are probably sponsoring fewer memberships, and many may support 
only a single membership.
Table 6 shows the self-indicated management level in relation to 
professional organization membership. For example, Table 5 
showed that ninety-one survey respondents or approximately ten 
percent Delta Nu Alpha members also belong to the American 
Society of Transportation and Logistics. Table 6 indicates that of
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these ninety-one dual members, sixteen were at the strategic 
management level, sixty were at the tactical level, nine were at the 
operations level, and six did not provide their level of management.
Sixty-four percent indicated that membership dues were fully 
supported by their employers. Twenty-two percent indicated that 
membership dues were only partially supported, and thirteen per­
cent stated that their employers provided no support The differ­
ences in financial support across level of management responsibility 
are shown in Figure 1. As one would expect, the higher the level in 
the managerial hierarchy, the greater the company sponsored 
support At the strategic level, seventy-seven percent were fully 
supported, eighteen percent were partially supported, and only five 
percent paid for their own professional activities. At the tactical 
level, sixty-seven percent were fully supported, twenty-three percent 
were partially supported, and ten percent provided their own 
support While at the operations level, fifty-one percent received 
full support, twenty-five percent were partially supported, and 
twenty-four percent have no company support for professional 
memberships.
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TABLE 5
PROFESSIONAL MEMBERSHIPS
Organization Number Percent
American Society of Transportation 
and Logistics 91 10%
Council of Logistics Management 78 8%
NIT League 66 7%
Association of Transportation Practioners 51 5%
Transportation/Public Utilities Croup - AEA 29 3%
Purchasing Management Association 18 2%
American Production and Inventory
Control Society 17 2%
Transportation Research Forum 7 1%
Transportation Research Board 7 1%
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TABLE 6
PROFESSIONAL MEMBERSHIPS BY MANAGERIAL LEVEL
Organization Total
Number
Strategic Tactical Operations Not
Stated
American Society 
of Transportation 
and Logistics 91 16 60 9 6
Council of
Logistics
Management 78 18 49 8 3
NIT League 66 18 41 6 1
Association of 
Transportation 
Practitioners 51 14 32 2 3
Transportation/
Public Utilities-AEA 29 7 13 9 0
Purchasing
Management
Association 18 3 13 2 0
American Production 
and Inventory
Control Society 17 3 12 2 0
Transportation 
Research Forum 7 1 3 1 2
Transportation 
Research Board 7 0 5 1 1
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FIGURE 1
COMPANY PAYS MEMBERSHIP DUES
PERCENT
None
Partial
None
STRATEGIC TACTICAL OPERATIONS
Salary Levels
Comparative salary levels by position title and in total for carriers 
and shippers are displayed in Tables 7 and 8. Table 9 shows the 
salary distribution by level of management. Fifty-two percent of the 
respondents at the operations level reported salaries between 
$30,000 and $50,000. At the tactical level, forty percent reported 
salaries between $40,000 and $60,000. The greatest variance in 
salaries was at the strategic level, where thirteen percent had salaries 
of $100,000 or more, but thirty-eight reported levels from $40,000 
to $60,000.
TABLE 7
CARRIER SALARY LEVELS BY MAJOR JOB TITLE
Salary Level President/
V. President
Terminal
Manager
Operations
Manager
Sales
Manager
Sales
Rep.
20000-29999 3% 16% 41% 7% 12%
30000-39999 13% 31% 32% 29% 48%
40000-49999 16% 20% 15% 23% 28%
50000-59999 22% 20% 3% 25% 9%
60000-69999 9% 11% 6% 9% 2%
70000-79999 15% 2% 3% 2% 1%
80000-89999 3%
90000-99999 6%
100000-UP 13% 5%
N 68 64 34 56 128
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TABLE 8
SHIPPER SALARY LEVELS BY MAJOR JOB TITLE
Salary Level President/
V. President
Director of 
Physical Distribution
Traffic
Manager
Transportation
Analyst
20000-29999 0% 4% 22% 45%
30000-39999 11% 4% 39% 33%
40000-49999 11% 32% 26% 17%
50000-59999 11% 28% 6% 5%
60000-69999 33% 19% 4%
70000-79999 11% 6% 2%
80000-89999 11% 2% 1%
90000-99999
100000-UP
11%
4%
N 9 47 189 42
Delta Nu Alpha demographics show a mature, experienced, 
welleducated work force with upward tending salaries. The salary 
increases appear to exceed inflation and cost of living increases, 
pointing to the growing status of transportation and distribution 
professionals.
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TABLE 9
SALARY LEVELS BY MANAGEMENT LEVEL
Salary Level Strategic Tactical Operations
20000-29999 6% 13% 37%
30000-39999 11% 37% 33%
40000-49999 19% 25% 19%
50000-59999 19% 14% 8%
60000-69999 15% 6% 2%
70000-79999 11% 2% 1%
80000-89999 3% 1%
90000-99999 3% 1%
100000-UP 13% 1%
N 128 432 243
80 Journal of Transportation Management
Status and Stress
Agreement concerning whether the deregulation movement has 
improved the status and role of a career in transportation and 
distribution management is summarized in Figure 2. Rail carriers 
expressed agreement with improved status. Also a strong majority of 
shippers agreed that deregulation had improved their status. The 
perception of change in status increased with managerial responsi­
bilities for shippers. However, the perception of change in status 
was markedly different for motor carriers. Nearly, half of the motor 
carriers disagreed that deregulation had improved their status. In 
addition, motor carrier managers at the strategic and tactical man­
agement levels indicates less improvement in status than those at the 
operations level.
The nature of the economy, not deregulation, affects movement 
of the total amount freight But the percentage of available freight 
that a particular type of carrier receives is highly influenced by 
deregulation. Rail carriers have shown impressive profit gains under 
deregulation, and this enhanced economic performance has likely 
resulted in both increased status and stress. Whereas, the motor 
carrier industry has had mixed financial results. Early under deregu­
lation, the industry suffered from the economic downturn, and the 
large number of new carriers permitted in the changed environment. 
This resulted in excess capacity and lead to wide spread discounting. 
While this excess capacity has partially been reduced and profitabil­
ity has been resorted to some degree, the responding motor carriers 
still indicate little support for deregulation.
Shippers in the 1976 survey did not express support for deregu­
lation, which implied the perception their status and role would not 
be improved under deregulation. Now, in 1988, over fifty-five 
percent of the shippers believe that their status has improved as a 
result of deregulation. One plausible explanation for this change is 
that traffic and distribution functions are still treated as expense 
centers, despite the conceptual arguments to convert to profit
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centers. The new pricing flexibility has allowed departments to 
move more freight through their systems at a lower unit cost, thus 
showing a very good expense performance.
All levels of management of motor and rail carriers indicated 
increased stress as shown in Figure 3. Overall, eighty-four percent of 
motor carriers and eighty-eight percent of the rail carriers agreed 
that deregulation has resulted in more stress. Shippers at the 
operations and tactical levels also considered the deregulated 
environment more stressful. However, less than half of the shippers 
at the strategic level viewed deregulation more stressful.
Organizational Issues
The survey made inquiry about preferences for decentralized 
carrier sales-marketing functions, centralized shipper trafficdistribu- 
tion functions, and national accounts selling. For many years, the 
major carriers grew in size and moved from a centralized owner- 
operator orientation to a more decentralized management style.
The implementation of this movement toward decentralized sales- 
marketing was often accomplished by a form of local territory or 
product management. Figure 4 shows that fifty-seven percent of all 
rail carriers preferred a decentralized sales-marketing function. It 
will be noted from Figure 4, that no rail managers at the strategic 
level preferred a decentralized sales-marketing function. However, 
this is a weak inference to all rail managers at the strategic level, in 
that this result is based on only five respondents. Overall, neither 
the motor carriers nor the shippers strongly supported sales-market­
ing decentralization. This implies that shippers want to deal with 
carriers at a higher managerial level. There was not much difference 
in shipper response by managerial level. However, motor carrier 
managers at the strategic level indicated much less support than 
those at the tactical and operations levels.
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Before the advent of the physical distribution concept, the 
distribution functions of traffic, inventory, and warehousing were 
scattered and decentralized, which resulted in the local carrier sales 
representative calling on the local traffic manager. But the new 
distribution concept called for the grouping of the distribution 
activity centers, and a centralization of responsibility control at either 
corporate headquarters or at a major distribution center. Rarely do 
textbooks or journal publications emphasize the potential benefits of 
distribution and customer service decentralization. The reason for 
this could lie in the many years spent in attempting to gain upper 
management's attention, while developing some form of control of 
the expenditures made to move products from the source of raw 
materials to the industrial user or ultimate consumer. Figure 5 shows 
that shippers strongly supported a centralized traffic-distribution 
function, with both rail and motor carriers being less supportive.
Shippers now tend to use significantly fewer carriers, and as a 
result, prefer to deal at a higher level in the carrier hierarchy. The 
organization charts of many carriers show that many have responded 
to this dilemma by establishing national account selling. While even 
the causal observer can see wide spread use of national account 
selling in this industry, Figure 6 shows that only a minority of both 
motor and rail carriers support this organizational form. Further, 
only approximately one-third of the shippers preferred national 
account selling.
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Decision-Making Style
Table 10 displays profiles of decision-making style preferences. 
The four decision-making style categories were labeled as "suppor­
tive", "aggressive", "creative", and "cautious". The most frequent 
style was the "supportive" style which described thirty-one percent 
of the respondents. The profile of the "supportive" style manager 
includes "being best in my field" as the most common primary work 
objective, tending to "look for new ideas" in the job, preferring 
either a "creative approach" or "careful analysis" to problem 
solving, avoiding "conflict", and being good at "interacting with 
others".
The "aggressive" style applied to twenty-seven percent of the 
respondents. The profile of the "aggressive" style manager includes 
"status or recognition" as the most frequent primary work objective, 
seeking the "best solutions" in the job, using "careful analysis" in 
problem solving, avoiding "long debates", and being good at 
"solving problems". The largest percentage of females were classi­
fied as having an "aggressive" decision-making style.
The "creative" style also described twenty-seven percent of the 
respondents. The profile of the "creative" style manager includes 
"being the best in my field" as the most frequent primary job objec­
tive, looking for "new ideas" in the job, adopting a "creative 
approach" to problem solving, avoiding "incomplete work", and 
being good at both "solving problems" and "seeing possibilities". 
The "creative" style had the smallest percentage of respondents at 
the operations level and the largest percentage at the tactical level 
within a given category.
The "cautious" style had the least number of respondents at 
fifteen percent. The profile of the "cautious" style manager includes 
"being the best in my field" as the most common primary job 
objective. However, it should be noted that thirty-five percent of 
those in this category stated that "security" was the prime objective.
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TABLE 10
DECISION-MAKING STYLE
Indicator "Supportive'' "Aggressive" "Creative" "Cautious"
Primary Objective:
Be the best 50% 37% 54% 54%
Status 28% 47% 30% 11%
Security 22% 16% 16% 35%
Look for in my job:
New ideas 41% 11% 55% 6%
Best solutions 34% 48% 31% 43%
Good environment 15% 10% 5% 14%
Practical results 10% 31% 9% 37%
Problem solving:
Creative approach 40% 12% 49% 7%
Careful analysis 39% 51% 40% 54%
Feelings 13% 12% 5% 14%
Proven approach 8% 25% 6% 25%
Like to avoid:
Conflict 52% 28% 9% 56%
Incomplete work 25% 31% 48% 25%
Long debates 17% 37% 33% 10%
Using numbers 6% 4% 10% 9%
I am good at:
Interacting 60% 28% 9% 34%
Solving problems 20% 36% 42% 28%
Seeing possibilities 13% 15% 37% 17%
Dates and facts 7% 21% 12% 21%
Management level:
Strategic 16% 18% 17% 11%
Tactical 54% 50% 61% 49%
Operations 30% 32% 21% 40%
Sex:
Female 27% 30% 20% 20%
Male 73% 70% 80% 80%
Forty-three percent look for "best solutions" in their job, while 
thirty-seven percent look for "practical results". The approach to 
problem solving is "careful analysis", "conflict" is avoided, and are 
good at "interacting with others" and "solving problems". This 
"cautious" style had the largest percentage at the operations level 
within a category.
SUMMARY
The Delta Nu Alpha membership is predominantly male, with 
nearly an equal split between shipper and carriers. Compared to the 
1976 survey, the number of rail carriers has declined, the number of 
motor carriers has increased, and the percentage to shippers has 
remained approximately the same. The most significant demo­
graphic change is the growth of the female membership. It appears 
that Delta Nu Alpha has capitalized on the growing number of 
women employed in transportation and distribution. The member­
ship has a higher education level than twelve years ago, and is 
younger. In total, Delta Nu Alpha demographics show a mature, 
experienced, and increasingly well-educated work force with 
upward trend in salaries.
The present Delta Nu Alpha membership does not have a large 
overlap of memberships with other professional organizations. The 
largest cross-membership is with the American Society of Transporta­
tion and Logistics. Two-thirds of Delta Nu Alpha members are fully 
supported by their employers for membership dues, with higher 
level managers receiving substantially more financial support than 
those at the tactical and operations levels.
Rail carriers and shippers consider the deregulation movement 
to have improved their career status. Motor carriers did not agree. 
All three groups were in general agreement that deregulation has sig­
nificantly increased job stress, especially at the operations level of 
management.
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Rail carriers indicated a preference for a decentralized sales- 
marketing function, but the motor carriers and the shippers did not 
Shippers preferred a centralized traffic-distribution function, while 
carriers gave much less support to this issue. Although national 
account selling is widely used in the industry, preference for this type 
of selling organization was weak from both carriers and shippers.
Four categories of decision style were identified and profiled. 
These profiles reflect differences in job objectives, what is looked for 
in a job, the preferred approach to problem solving, what is to be 
avoided, and what managers feel they are good at Different styles 
are related to managerial level, and to a lesser extent, sex.
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AN EVALUATION OF MOTOR CARRIER SALES REPRESENTATIVES: 
THE PERSPECTIVE OF CARRIER SALES MANGERS
by
Peter M. Lynagh, University of Baltimore,
Paul R. Murphy, John Carroll University and 
Richard F. Poist, University of Maryland
INTRODUCTION
The growing body of literature on services marketing increas­
ingly recognizes the crucial role played by salespeople in the 
marketing of services. For example, early writings pointed out that 
salespeople could be helpful in reducing customer anxiety associ­
ated with the purchasing of services, which tend to be intangible in 
nature.1 More recent work suggests that service firms utilize sales 
representatives to communicate customer service policies to their 
customers.2
However, it appears as if motor carriers have been slow to 
recognize the importance of a well-managed sales force. For 
instance, a leading distribution executive has asserted that a profes­
sional and knowledgeable motor carrier sales force can lead to in­
creased market shares for individual motor carriers in part by 
attracting business from competing firms.3 In addition, an annual 
survey conducted by Distribution Magazine, which asks users of 
trucking services to rate individual carriers along the dimensions of 
service, price, convenience and sales, has consistently found motor 
carriers to be ranked lowest on the sales component4
In many instances, the task of improving sales force performance 
falls to sales managers. While motor carrier sales managers have a 
number of responsibilities, certainly some of the most important
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involve the recruitment, selection and training of sales personnel. 
Poor recruitment and selection, along with inadequate training, 
increase the likelihood of sales force turnover; the out-of-pocket 
costs of such turnover in the motor carrier industry have been 
estimated at nearly $40,000 per sales representative.4 5
Moreover, the recruitment, selection and training of new sales 
representatives will reflect the sales manager's perception of various 
attributes that should be possessed by individual salespeople. If a 
sales manager feels that a salesperson should be outgoing, then 
selection techniques, such as psychological testing, might be utilized 
to learn about the personality of each recruit Similarly, training 
programs will be structured to feature the types of knowledge that a 
sales manager deems necessary for successful sales force perform­
ance.
The purpose of this paper is to learn more about characteristics 
associated with successful performance by motor carrier sales 
personnel, as perceived by motor carrier sales managers. Specifi­
cally, this paper will investigate the following issues:
1. What are the absolute and relative importance of various 
salesperson characteristics in the selling of motor carrier 
services?
2. Are there statistically significant relationships between 
responses to these attributes and selected demographic 
variables?
3. Have motor carrier sales mangers altered their perceptions 
of desirable sales force characteristics between the
mid-1970s and the late 1980s?
4. What implications do the findings of this study have for
sales force management in the motor carrier industry?
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METHODOLOGY
Four hundred U.S. motor carriers, randomly selected from a 
recent edition of the Official Motor Carrier Directory, were sent a 
survey dealing with the importance of selected sales force character­
istics. A concerted effort was made to address the survey to the 
highest ranking sales executive at individual firms. One hundred 
seventy-nine usable returns were received, for a response rate of 
44.8%. This response rate was considered high for a mail survey of 
this type and indicated an apparent interest in the study topic.
A demographic profile of respondents is presented in Table 1. 
The one hundred and seventy-nine responding companies represent 
a variety of size categories; 53% have annual revenues of under 
$25,000,000, while 19% of the responses came from motor carriers 
with annual revenues in excess of $100,000,000. Respondents 
appeared to be well-compensated (75% earn at least $40,000 per 
year) and fairly well-educated (45% possess at least a four year 
college degree). Likewise, survey participants were overwhelmingly 
male, with only six of the 1 79 respondents being female. The 
remainder of the paper will be devoted to a presentation and discus­
sion of other empirical findings.
IMPORTANCE OF SALESPERSON CHARACTERISTICS
One portion of the survey asked sales managers to evaluate the 
importance of 26 salesperson characteristics along a five point scale 
ranging from 0 = "no importance to" 4 = "maximum importance"; 
twenty-two of these attributes were drawn from a similar study 
conducted in the mid1970s.6 Four characteristics (knowledge of 
electronic data interchange (EDI), knowledge of the deregulated 
transportation environment, knowledge of intermodal transport 
opportunities, and communication skills) were added in this study to 
reflect changes in both the transportation industry and overall 
business environment since the mid-1970s.
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TABLE 1
DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILE OF RESPONDENTS (n = 179)
AGE
20-29
3.9%
30-39
33.0%
40-49
30.7%
50-59
18.4%
60 and
14.0%
over
ANNUAL SALARY:
Under $30,000- $40,000- $50,000- $60,000- $70,000- $80,000- $100,000-
$30,000 $39,999 $49,999 $59,999 $69,999 $79,999 $99,000 and over
7.0% 17.4% 15.7% 20.9% 9.9% 8.7% 7.6% 12.8%
EDUCATION LEVEL:
High
School
College
No Degree
4 Year College 
Degree
Graduate School
No Degree
Master's
Degree
Ph.D
17.3% 37.4% 36.9% 3.4% 5.0% 0.0%
SEX:
Male
96.6%
Female
3.4%
n = Number of Respondents
TABLE 1 Continued
DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILE OF RESPONDENTS (n = 179)
ANNUAL FIRM REVENUES:
Under
$25,000,000
52.6%
$25,000,000-
$49,999,999
17.9%
$50,000,000-
$99,999,999
10.4%
$100,000,000-
$499,999,999
11.0%
$500,000,000- 
and over
8.1%
YEARS WITH PRESENT EMPLOYER (Company Tenure):
Less than 1 -5 6 - 10 11-15 16-20 Over 20
years years years years years years
3.4% 24.0% 25.7% 17.3% 9.5% 20.1%
YEARS IN PRESENT JOB (Job Tenure):
Less than 1 -5 6-10 11 -15 16-20 Over 20
years years years years years years
4.5% 44.1% 24.0% 9.5% 7.8% 10.1%
n = Number of Respondents
The results for the twenty-six characteristics, presented in Table 
2, show that the most important attribute is ethical conduct by the 
salesperson. Ethical behavior, such as fairness and honesty, is also 
important to shippers. A recent study conducted by Traffic Manage­
ment found that users value motor carrier honesty above all other 
traits.7
This emphasis on ethical behavior is an interesting finding, given 
the questionable tactics that have been employed by some carriers 
and their salespeople in the past, most notably with respect to the 
undercharge issue.8 In addition, false or misleading presentations by 
carrier sales personnel appear to be a common complaint in the 
less-than-truckload (LTL) segment of the motor carrier industry.9 The 
fact that 75% of this study's respondents feel that ethical sales force 
conduct is of maximum importance, is a clear indication that most 
truckers want harmonious relationships with their users.
Moreover, the commitment of sales managers to ethical conduct 
by their sales personnel is seen in the response to gratuities (or gifts) 
offered by salespeople. This attribute is the .lowest ranked of the 26 
characteristics; nearly 60% of the respondents indicate that gratuities 
are of no importance or of slight importance for effective sales 
performance. These gratuities, which can take many forms, such as 
meals and entertainment, may be viewed as an attempt to "buy" 
clients. Although this trait is the least importance of those investi­
gated, it is interesting to note that roughly 10% of the respondents 
feel that gratuities are of great or maximum importance for success­
ful performance by motor carrier sales representatives.
The survey results also suggest that a salesperson's promptness 
in dealing with customers is the second most important characteris­
tic, with nearly two-thirds of the respondents assigning this trait to 
the "maximum importance" category. One explanation for this 
finding is that sales managers have recognized the importance of 
customer service in a deregulated environment, and that in service 
industries (such as trucking) customer service arises from frequent 
contact between the customer and the supplier.10
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TABLE 2
ABSOLUTE AND RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF SALES FORCE CHARACTERISTICS (n = 179)
Characteristic Of No 
Importance
Of Slight 
Importance
Of Moderate 
Importance
Of Great 
Importance
Of Maximum 
Importance
Mean Score3 
Importance
Ethical conduct by salesperson 0.0% 0.0% 1.15% 22.9% 76.0%c 3.749b
Promptness in overall dealings 
with customers 0.0% 0.0% 1.7% 31.8% 66.5% 3.648
Knowledge of carrier's operating 
schedules 0.0% 0.6% 6.7% 34.6% 58.1% 3.503
Self-confidence 0.0% 0.6% 5.6% 39.3% 54.5% 3.478
Knowledge of carrier's route 
structure 0.0% 1.5% 6.7% 44.1% 47.5% 3.409
Communication skills 0.6% 0.0% 5.0% 51.4% 43.0% 3.363
Knowledge of carrier's equipment 0.0% 1.1% 11.2% 40.8% 46.9% 3.335
Neat appearance 0.0% 0.0% 6.7% 54.2% 39.1% 3.324
Knowledge of customer's 
logistics system 0.0% 0.6% 10.1% 48.0% 41.3% 3.302
Willingness to arrange expedited 
service 0.6% 1.7% 11.2% 41.8% 44.7% 3.285
Knowledge of carrier's rates 0.0% 0.0% 9.5% 54.2% 36.3% 3.268
Information feedback provided 
by salesperson 0.6% 1.1% 10.6% 50.3% 37.4% 3.229
Friendly personality 0.0% 0.0% 15.6% 49.2% 35.2% 3.196
Knowledge of customer's product 0.0% 1.1% 20.7% 47.5% 30.7% 3.078
TABLE 2 Continued
ABSOLUTE AND RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF SALES FORCE CHARACTERISTICS (n = 179)
Characteristic Of No 
Importance
Of Slight 
Importance
Of Moderate 
Importance
Of Great 
Importance
Of Maximum 
Importance
Mean Score3 
Importance
Willingness to discuss rate
change proposals 0.0% 2.8% 19.6% 51.4% 26.3% 3.011
Knowledge of carrier's competitors 0.6% 3.9% 16.2% 54.7% 24.6% 2.989
Knowledge of the deregulated
transportation enviornment 0.6% 4.5% 23.5% 44.7% 26.8% 2.927
Claims assistance 0.0% 5.6% 39.7% 44.7% 10.0% 2.592
Ability to influence loss and damage 0.0% 10.6% 34.6% 41.3% 13.4% 2.575
Knowledge of overall
transportation industry 0.6% 5.1% 42.0% 44.4% 7.9% 2.539
Knowledge of interline connections 9.0% 9.0% 34.3% 28.7% 19.0% 2.399
Knowledge of electronic data
interchange 1.1% 12.3% 41.9% 36.3% 8.4% 2.385
Education level achieved 5.0% 6.7% 58.1% 25.7% 4.5% 2.179
Knowledge of intermodal
transport opportunities 3.9% 16.3% 50.0% 24.2% 5.6% 2.112
Attendance at professional meetings 4.0% 26.6% 52.5% 15.2% 1.7% 1.842
Gratuities offered by the
salesperson 30.9% 28.7% 32.0% 6.2% 2.2% 1.202
aMean score based on 0 = no importance and 4 = maximum importance 
Characteristics are presented from highest mean score to lowest mean score 
'Percentages may not add up to 100% due to rounding
The information in Table 2 further indicates that motor carrier 
sales managers feel that their sales representatives must be knowl­
edgeable about carrier operations, specifically carrier schedules, 
routes and equipment For example, knowledge of operating 
schedules emerges as the third most important attribute, with nearly 
60% of respondents indicating that such knowledge is of maximum 
importance for successful sales force performance. One explanation 
for this finding is that the motor carrier industry's increasing involve­
ment with Just-in-Time inventory systems places high priority on reli­
able operating schedules; irregularity can lead to stockouts and/or 
production line shutdowns, both of which create customer dissatis­
faction.
The increasing motor carrier participation in JIT traffic also 
provides an explanation for the importance of sales force knowledge 
of carrier equipment (mean score = 3.35). For instance, one 
equipment consideration involves the average fleet age for individual 
carriers; older equipment is more likely to break down, which 
obviously impacts transit time reliability. In addition, a number of 
large LTL carriers are adding smaller trailers (e.g., 28 ft trailers 
known as "pups") to their fleets, due in part to the smaller, more 
frequent orders associated with JIT systems.
Survey participants also suggest that sales representatives should 
be knowledgeable as to their carrier's route structure. There are 
several explanations for this finding, with one being that since 
passage of the Motor Carrier Act (MCA) of 1980 many shippers have 
reduced the number of carriers they use; one factor in this decision 
is the scope of geographic coverage. Secondly, shippers are actively 
seeking to reduce interlining due to the slower transit times and 
increased handling of goods. Since shippers generally prefer those 
carriers with the ability to provide direct service between particular 
city pairs, motor carrier sales representatives need to be cognizant of 
their carrier's route structure.
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Furthermore, the information in Table 2 suggests that sales 
managers emphasize personal characteristics of sales representatives, 
with self-confidence ranked fourth most important, communication 
skills as sixth in importance, and neat appearance ranked as the 
eighth most important attribute. This might influence the practices 
used in the selection of motor carrier sales representatives; for 
example, personal interviews would appear to be an excellent 
method for evaluating a candidate's self-confidence, appearance and 
communication abilities.
Turning to low-ranked attributes, respondents assigned low 
importance to a salesperson's attendance at professional meetings 
(mean = 1.842) as well as his/her educational history (mean =
2.179). The finding on professional meetings is not surprising in that 
many motor carriers have reduced their participation at such events 
because of potential antitrust (e.g., collusion with shippers) concerns. 
However, the results on education are somewhat unexpected, given 
that universities are the recruiting source most likely to be added by 
LTL motor carriers over the next several years 11
In addition, two of the least important sales force characteristics, 
knowledge of intermodal transport opportunities (ranked 24th out 
the 26 traits) and knowledge of electronic data interchange (ranked 
22nd) had been included in this study to reflect changes in the 
transportation industry and American business since the mid-1970s. 
The finding on intermodal knowledge may be a reflection of the fact 
that motor carriers are not considered major players in the marketing 
of intermodal services and that brokers, railroads and third party 
agents are more likely to dominate this phase of intermodal activi­
ties.
The relative unimportance of EDI is an unexpected result, given 
the increasing use of computers in American business. In fact, the 
mean score of 2.385 indicates that survey participants feel that EDI 
knowledge is only of moderate importance for successful sales force 
performance. One explanation for the low rating and ranking of this
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attribute is that EDI utilization appears to be in the early stages at 
many trucking companies.12 As EDI becomes more commonplace in 
the motor carrier industry, salesperson knowledge of EDI should 
become a more valuable attribute.
A review of the literature as well as consultation with industry 
experts indicated that the 26 salesperson characteristics evaluated in 
this study could be divided into three distinct categories... Personal, 
Service, and Knowledge. Personal characteristics represent those 
factors relating to an individual salesperson, their character and 
professional background. Service-related characteristics represent 
factors which provide service, assistance or tangible value to the 
shipper. Finally, Knowledge-related characteristics represent types 
of information possessed by salespeople relating to the carrier, 
customer and industry. These three groupings, presented in Table 3, 
indicate that motor carrier sales managers place heaviest emphasis 
on personal attributes, with a median category score of 3.324. In 
addition, five of the seven personal attributes have a mean rating of 
3.000 ("great importance)" or better. The information in Table 3 
also suggests that service (category median = 3.011) and knowledge 
(category median = 3.035) characteristics are 
of roughly equal importance.
As previously discussed, personal characteristics of sales person­
nel may best be addressed in the selection of sales representatives, 
whereas service and knowledge attributes might be associated with 
sales force training practices. The fact that respondents, on the 
whole, favor personal attributes over service and knowledge charac­
teristics might suggest that extra attention is devoted to selection 
techniques, with a lesser emphasis on training. This subject will be 
addressed again in the summary, and implications section of the 
paper.
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TABLE 3
IMPORTANCE OF PERSONAL, SERVICE AND KNOWLEDGE-RELATED CHARACTERISTICS
PERSONAL SERVICE KNOWLEDGE
Characteristic Average Rating Characteristic Average Rating Characteristic Average Rating
Ethical conduct by Promptness in Carrier's operating
salesperson 3.749 customer dealings 3.648 Schedules 3.503
Self-confidence 3.478 Arrange expedited Carrier's route
Service 3.285 Structure 3.408
Communication skill 3.363
Information feedback 3.229 Carrier's equipment 3.335
Neat appearance 3.324
Discuss rate change Customer's
Friendly personality 3.196 proposals 3.001 logistics system 3.302
Educational level Claims assistance 2.592 Carrier's rates 3.268
Achieved 2.179
Loss and damage 2.575 Customer's products 3.078
Attendance at
professional meetings 1.842 Cratuities offered 1.202 Carrier's competitors 2.989
TABLE 3
IMPORTANCE OF PERSONAL, SERVICE AND KNOWLEDGE-RELATED CHARACTERISTICS
PERSONAL
Characteristic Average Rating
SERVICE
Characteristic Average Rating
KNOWLEDGE
Characteristic Average Rating
Deregulated transportation 
environment 2.927
Overall transportation 
industry 2.539
Interline connections 2.399
Electronic data 
interchange 2.385
Intermodal transportation 
opportunities 2.112
Category Median:3 3.324 3.011 3.035
3The median represents the middle score in a set of numbers arranged in ascending or descending order.
DEMOGRAPHIC RELATIONSHIPS
Table 4 provides information on the statistically significant 
relationships, at the .05 level or better, that were discovered when 
the 26 sales force characteristics were analyzed in terms of six 
selected demographic variables. Twenty-eight of the 156 (1 7.95%) 
possible relationships emerged as statistically significant. The results 
in Table 4 represent the maximum number of significant relation­
ships that could be identified within a particular demographic 
variable. For example, although only five significant relationships 
appear when respondents under 50 years of age are compared to 
those over 50, other age dimensions (e.g., under 40 vs. over 40) 
generated fewer statistically significant relationships.
The remainder of this section will focus on the significant 
differences involving salary and annual revenues because these 
variables show the highest number of significant relationships when 
compared to the 26 salesperson characteristics. With respect to 
salary, t-tests of mean equality for respondents earning less than 
$60,000 against those earning $60,000 or more revealed nine 
statistically differences, with six of these attributes being more 
important to respondents with annual revenues of $60,000 or more. 
In fact, all four of the significant knowledge attributes are more 
important to the higher-salaried sales managers. Given that salary 
often acts as a surrogate for job title and managerial level (i.e., higher 
salary associated with more prestigious and senior-level jobs), the 
salary t-tests suggest that motor carrier sales managers increase their 
opportunities for advancement by developing sales representatives 
who deal promptly with customers and who are knowledgeable 
about their company's, rates, routes and operating schedules. In 
contrast, the lower-salaried sales manager respondents attached 
greater importance to claims assistance, attendance at professional 
meetings, and gratuities offered by their salespeople.
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TABLE 4
T-TEST OF RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN SALESFORCE CHARACTERISTICS AND DEMOGRAPHIC VARIABLES*
AGE « 50; _> 50) SALARY « $60,000; _> $60,000) REVENUES (<$25,000,000; > $25,000,000)
Claims Assistance (2) Promptness in Dealing w/Customer (2) Self-confidence (2)
Knowledge of EDI (1) Knowledge of Carrier's Route Structure (2) Knowledge of Carrier's Route Structure (2)
Education Level (2) Communication Skills (2) Communication Skills (2)
Knowledge of Intermodal Opport. (2) Knowledge of Customer's Products (2) Knowledge of Customer's Logistics Systems (2)
Gratuities (2) Knowledge of Carrier's Rates (2)
Claims Assistance (1)
Attendance at Professional Meetings (1) 
Gratuities (1)
Knowledge of Carrier's Operating Schedule (2)
Claims Assistance (1)
Knowledge of EDI (2)
Attendance at Professional Meetings (1)
aOnly those relationships statistically significant at the .05 level (or better) are listed in this table.
(1) : Indicates that higher mean score was associated with Group 1.
(2) : Indicates that higher mean score was associated with Group 2.
TABLE 4 continued
T-TEST OF RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN SALESFORCE CHARACTERISTICS AND DEMOGRAPHIC VARIABLES3
EDUCATION (< 4 year college; > 4 yrs) COMPANY TENURE(< 10 years > 10 years) REVENUES (<5 years; > 5 years)
Knowledge of Carrier's Equipment (1) Knowledge of Carrier's Operating Schedule (2) 
Friendly Personality (2)
Knowledge of Interline Connection (2)
Ethical Conduct (1)
Knowledge of Customer's Logistics Systems (1) 
Knowledge of Carrier's Rates (1)
aOnly those relationships statistically significant at the .05 level (or better) are listed in this table.
(1) : Indicates that higher mean score was associated with Croup 1.
(2) : Indicates that higher mean score was associated with Croup 2.
The information in Table 4 also indicates that seven of the 26 
sales force characteristics have significantly different means when 
respondents are classified according to annual firm revenues. Three 
of the differences involve personal traits, one involves service 
attributes, and three are concerned with knowledge characteristics. 
Moreover, in all but two cases, (i.e., claims assistance, and atten­
dance at professional meetings), larger firms indicate that the 
particular attribute is of more importance than do smaller compa­
nies.
For instance, larger carriers (mean = 2.683) place much heavier 
emphasis on a salesperson's EDI knowledge than do smaller carriers 
(mean = 2.143), which is in line with the fact that the so-called "Big 
Three" LTL carriers-Yellow Freight, Roadway, Consolidated Freight- 
ways—have been industry leaders in EDI implementation.13 It is also 
noteworthy that larger carriers place more importance on certain 
personal attributes, such as self-confidence and communication 
skills. This may be an indication that the larger motor carriers have 
better developed sales force selection programs, because as previ­
ously mentioned, personal attributes can be somewhat controlled 
through selection practices.
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
As mentioned earlier, twenty-two of the characteristics in this 
study were also analyzed in a similar project conducted in the mid- 
1970s; this section discusses the results that emerge from a compari­
son of these 22, traits. While the sampling procedure was identical, 
the individual respondents and the carriers they represented did vary 
between the two studies. A major rationale for this comparison is 
that the MCA of 1980 has been acknowledged as causing profound 
changes in the trucking industry. The literature points out that major 
organizational change, such as deregulation, creates corporate 
upheaval. As a result, firms can be expected to adjust to change, 
because failure to do so will increase the length of organizational
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uncertainty and instability.14 For example, recent research has 
suggested that those motor carriers which have been slow to adapt 
their sales force management practices to meet the new, competitive 
environment are characterized by less productive sales forces.15
A comparison of the 1975 and current studies, presented in 
Table 5, indicates minor differences in both the absolute and relative 
importance of the 22 characteristics. With respect to absolute 
results, the overall mean score for the 1975 study (2.952) differs 
from that of the current study (2.961) by less than .01. In addition, 
the mean scores for several attributes are nearly identical in the two 
studies. For example, the mean rating for information provided by a 
salesperson in the current study, 3.229, is but .008 lower than the 
average score for this trait in 1975. Similarly, the differences in 
mean ratings for promptness in dealing with customers is only .009. 
Because only summary results exist for the 1975 study, statistical 
tests for mean differences could not be performed between the two 
studies.
Analysis of the relative importance of the 22 characteristics also 
reveals a high degree of similarity between the two studies. As 
pointed out in Table 5, the Spearman correlation between the 1975 
rankings and current rankings generated a coefficient of .898, which 
is statistically significant at the .001 level and indicative of minimal 
ranking differences between the two studies. In fact, eight of the 22 
attributes have the same rankings in both 1975 and at present; 
ethical behavior is most important in both studies, while gratuities 
are least important
Nevertheless, several of the characteristics exhibit notable rating 
and ranking differences, with the most prominent involving pricing 
issues. In the 1975 study, a salesperson's willingness to discuss rate 
change proposals had an average score of 2.115 and was ranked 
twentieth in importance. This attribute's mean rating in the present 
study was 3.011 (an increase of .896) and was ranked 14th (an 
increase of six positions). In a similar vein, a salesperson's knowl-
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TABLE 5
COMPARISON OF 1975 AND CURRENT STUDIES3
Salesperson 1975b Current
Characteristic Mean (Rank) Mean (Rank)
Neat appearance 3.305 (7) 3.324 (7)
Knowledge of carrier's equipment 3.321 (6) 3.335 (6)
Friendly personality 3.237 (11) 3.197 (12)
Knowledge of carrier's operating schedules 3.603 (3) 3.503 (3)
Attendance at professional meetings 1.939 (21) 1.842 (21)
Knowledge of customer's logistics system 3.206 (12) 3.302 (8)
Education level achieved 2.351 (19) 2.179 (20)
Willingness to discuss rate change proposals 2.115 (20) 3.011 (14)
Ability to influence loss and damage 2.382 (18) 2.575 (17)
Willingness to arrange expedited service 3.450 (5) 3.285 (9)
Knowledge of carrier's competitors 3.168 (13) 2.989 (15)
Knowledge of customer's products 3.252 (9) 3.078 (13)
Gratuities offered by the salesperson 1.344 (22) 1.202 (22)
Knowledge of overall transportation industry 2.626 (16) 2.539 (18)
Ethical conduct by salesperson 3.771 (1) 3.749 (D
Self-confidence 3.565 (4) 3.478 (4)
Promptness in overall dealings with customer 3.656 (2) 3.648 (2)
Claims assistance 2.771 (15) 2.592 (16)
Information feedback provided by salesperson 3.237 (10) 3.229 (11)
Knowledge of carrier's rates 2.527 (17) 3.268 (10)
Knowledge of carrier's route structures 3.298 (8) 3.408 (5)
Knowledge of interline connection 2.809 (14) 2.399 (19)
OVERALL MEAN 2.952 2.961
involving characteristic used in both studies. 
bPoist, Richard and Peter Lynagh, The Motor Carrier Salesman, 
(Washington, D.C.: American Trucking Association), 1975. 
Spearman coefficient of rank = .898, significant at p< .001.
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edge of rates had a mean of 2.527 in 1975 and was 17th in impor­
tance. In the current study the mean rating had risen to 3.268 (an 
increase of .741) and was ranked tenth in importance, representing 
an improvement of seven positions. These results support previous 
assertions that deregulation has caused motor carrier pricing prac­
tices to assume higher priority as a carrier selection tool.16
Another characteristic exhibiting marked change between 1975 
and at present involves a salesperson's knowledge of interline 
connections. Unlike the pricing attributes discussed in the previous 
paragraph, both the absolute and relative importance of interline 
knowledge has decreased since the mid-1970$. The mean rating for 
interline knowledge dropped from 2.809 in 1975 to 2.399 currently, 
a decrease of .410; likewise, the 1975 ranking of l4th is five places 
higher than today. These findings are due likely to the increased 
route freedoms fostered by the MCA, which have made it easier for 
carriers to operate over broader geographic areas, thus reducing the 
need for interlining.
The preceding paragraphs suggest that both the absolute and 
relative importance of many of the 22 attributes common to both 
studies remain virtually unchanged, an indication that motor carriers 
may have been slow to adapt to the opportunities and challengers of 
the contemporary trucking industry. This, in turn, can have impor­
tant strategic implications, not the least of which is that tentative 
reaction to major change hinders the chances for organizational 
growth and survival.17 In this vein, work by Smith and Grimm has 
found that railroads pursuing the same strategy prior to and follow­
ing deregulation had noticeably inferior performance to those that 
changed their strategies in response to the Staggers Act.18
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SUMMARY AND IMPLICATIONS
The purpose of the study was to identify characteristics associ­
ated with successful performance by motor carrier sales representa­
tives. Armed with this information, carrier sales executives can 
design more effective selling strategies as well as improve recruiting 
and training practices.
In terms of designing sales strategies, the study findings should 
prove valuable in several ways. First, the results provide insight as to 
the types of salesperson characteristics perceived to be most and 
least important by a large sample of sales executives. For individual 
sales managers and representatives this information should provide a 
useful benchmark with which to compare one's own opinions. 
Likewise, relatively unexperienced sales managers can benefit from 
the opinions of their more experienced peers.
Secondly, the results provide insight as to the distinctive features 
of selling strategies traceable to demographic differences of respon­
dents. For, example, the result suggest that sales managers of larger 
carriers are emphasizing effective salesperson communication skills 
as well as knowledge of the customer's logistics system and EDI to 
set them apart from smaller carriers in their sales efforts. In contrast, 
sales managers from smaller carriers are stressing claims assistance 
and sales rep attendance at professional meetings in differentiating 
their sales efforts. While space does not permit a more elaborate 
discussion, similar distinctions in strategy can be observed with 
respect to other demographic variables by referring to Table 4. For 
the carrier sales executive who wants to keep abreast of what other 
carriers are thinking and doing, such information can prove useful in 
gaining and/or maintaining a competitive edge.
Likewise, the study results should prove useful for improving 
recruiting and training practices. For example, sales manager 
respondents indicate that the most important sales force characteris­
tic is ethical behavior, such as honesty and fairness. The importance
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of ethical conduct is further emphasized by the fact that a salesper­
son's usage of gratuities emerged as the lowest ranked attribute in 
this study.
One ramification of these findings is that sales force training 
programs should devote time to learning about ethical behavior, 
perhaps through the use of case studies. In addition, motor carrier 
sales executives might explore selection techniques, such as psycho­
logical testing, that offer indications on the ethical makeup of sales 
recruits. It has been suggested also that a strong code of ethics be 
adopted to govern shipper-carrier relations.19
Sales manager respondents also point out that motor carrier 
salespeople need to be knowledgeable about various aspects of 
carrier operations, specifically with respect to equipment, route 
structure and operating schedules. At a minimum, these findings 
suggest increased training content devoted to operations informa­
tion. In addition, these findings illustrated the interfaces that exist 
between the selling and operations functions; as a result, it is 
important for sales representatives to be aware of carrier operational 
capabilities so that unrealistic service promises are not made to 
customers. One way of ensuring this is through a job rotation or 
exchange program involving the sales and operations departments. 
Likewise so-called "Quality Circles" might be created to discuss 
problems of mutual interest and thereby improve communications 
among sales and operations personnel.
Moreover, it can be postulated that a major environmental 
upheaval, such as the MCA of 1980, should result in changes in sales 
force practice. However, one of the key findings of this study is that 
the motor carrier industry's perception of desirable sales force 
attributes have changed minimally between the mid-1970s and the 
present One explanation for this is that deregulation has encour­
aged greater emphasis and change regarding pricing and new service 
offerings at the expense of personal selling efforts.
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Likewise, during this timespan, sales managers continued to 
place heavier emphasis on a sales representative's personal charac­
teristics than on either service or knowledge attributes. For example, 
such personal attributes as ethical conduct, self-confidence, commu­
nication skills, and neat appearance were rated as being of “maxi­
mum importance" by 40 percent or more of respondents. As 
previously mentioned, this emphasis on personal characteristics 
might suggest that greater attention is currently being devoted to the 
selection process with regard to sales reps with a lesser attention to 
training. This may help to explain the fact that recent research has 
indicated that average sales force training in the trucking industry is 
noticeably shorter than in many other service industries.20
At the same time, there is strong evidence to suggest that 
shippers are dissatisfied with the lack of customer orientation 
displayed by motor carrier sales representatives. This was true prior 
to deregulation as well as at present21 As previously mentioned in 
the introduction to this paper, Distribution's annual shipper survey 
consistently finds motor carriers to be weakest on the sales dimen­
sion. In the magazine's 1988 survey, it was reported that “Shippers 
are nearly unanimous in their panning of carrier sales reps. Many 
shippers complain that they never see a sales rep; others say the 
ones they see are woefully unfit for the job"22
Other anecdotal evidence also exists. For example, a top 
distribution executive at Computerland Corporation was quoted as 
saying “...today's carrier representatives need to be more profes­
sional and businesslike in their approach... the day of 'Polyester 
Harry' with a cigar and a bottle of booze are passe." This executive 
also indicated that personal characteristics such as neat appearance 
are part of professionalism, but stressed that sales reps need to be 
more knowledgeable about rates and pricing and need to do their 
homework before visiting customers.23
In essence, it appears that shippers would prefer to deal with 
more knowledgeable and professional sales personnel, whereas 
motor carriers appear to be emphasizing style (i.e., in the form of
Volume 2, Number I 117
personal attributes) over substance in their current sales practices. 
Consequently, sales force practices in the motor carrier industry 
need to be reviewed and perhaps, revised. The successful motor 
carrier of the future will be one that thoroughly understand its 
shippers' need and preferences and is able to tailor its services and 
sales efforts accordingly.
The key to this success is for carriers to modify the "operations 
orientation" which has been so prevalent in the past and combine it 
with a strong "customer orientation". A number of carriers are 
actively striving to achieve such an orientation. For example, Yellow 
Freight has developed a Quality Assurance Program that stresses the 
following principles: (1) Teamwork, (2) Doing the basics right the 
first time, (3) Productivity improvement, (4) Customer satisfaction, (5) 
Improved communication, (6) Continuous training and education, 
and (7) Searching for continuous improvements for the good of the 
carrier and its customers24
Regarding the importance of customer satisfaction, Craig Cina, 
Director of Market Planning for Yellow states "Now, more than ever 
before, it's essential that we listen to our customers, understand 
what they're saying as it applies to serving them better, and then 
respond to what they tell us."25 To facilitate these efforts, the carrier 
is developing a quantitative customer satisfaction measurement and 
feedback system to demonstrate their commitment to listening and 
improving.
Finally, this study also has implications for shippers or users of 
trucking services by providing greater insight into the training and 
selection of sales reps as well as identifying sales preferences based 
upon demographic variables. Moreover, if their needs are to be 
met, shippers must communicate their wants and expectations 
regarding carrier salespeople. In other words, shippers should play 
an active role in helping carriers assess and define what is lacking in 
current sales relations.
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In turn, carriers must make a commitment to listen and strive to 
address deficiencies if they are to be truly dedicated to a “customer 
orientation". Rather than adversaries working at cross purposes, 
shippers and carriers should view themselves as partners or allies 
striving for a mutual goal. It is this so-called “Win-Win" scenario in 
which both parties benefit that is required for success in today's 
highly competitive and rapidly changing transportation environment
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BOOK REVIEWS
CONTEMPORARY TRANSPORTATION: Donald F. Wood and James 
C. Johnson, 3rd ed., New York: Macmillan, 1989.
This text has been vastly revised for the third edition and now 
includes some critical chapters that acknowledge the management 
problems in transportation in the post-deregulation era. While the 
world turned upside down in 1980, or thereabouts, the transporta­
tion principles texts did not necessarily do so. To some extent, they 
could not. How can one write about "principles of transportation" 
when the principles are no longer well established? Granting that 
many of the true principles of the discipline remain intact regardless 
of the deregulatory climate, much of what filled the pages of basic 
transportation books became dated. This new edition of 
Contemporary Transportation is one of the first general transporta­
tion texts to fully acknowledge the necessary changes.
The introductory section of the text contains a chapter that 
should be of particular assistance in building transportation under­
graduate majors--"Transportation Employment and Careers," 
Chapter 3. Given the "will it get me a job" orientation of under­
graduate business majors, this chapter helps to focus on what 
happens to transportation majors when they graduate. The carrier 
section of the text contains one chapter on each of the five modes, 
plus a chapter on intermodal and auxiliary carriers. It also incorpo­
rates Chapter 11, "Pricing, Rates, and Negotiations," a specific area 
omitted from some of the major texts currently on the market The 
shippers' section has a chapter on inbound logistics, as well as the 
traditional physical distribution and traffic management chapters.
The final section, Carrier Management, looks at public sector, private 
sector, and international transportation. A new chapter has been 
added on the increasingly important area of the emerging or en­
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trepreneurial carrier or logistician. Each chapter has some mini­
cases at the end which help to emphasize some of the points related 
to the subject matter in the chapter.
One approach that the authors use in the text seems to be of 
increasing importance: computer screens as graphics to support text 
material. They show Yellow Freight's ZIP rating system in their 
discussion of pricing, rates and negotiations. If any criticism can be 
made of this approach, it is that it should be used more and used in 
other areas than rates. One reality of the post-deregulation era in 
transportation is the increasing use of computers in every aspect of 
the business.
While it would be nice to see more material on each of the five 
modes of transportation, that is not possible in a principles text that 
covers as much material as this one does. The book is well written, 
well-researched, and organized in a useful way. It is recommended 
for any undergraduate survey course in transportation, or as a 
supplement in an introductory graduate course.
Stephen A. LeMay 
Mississippi State University
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LAW AND ECONOMIC REGULATION IN TRANSPORTATION:
by Paul Stephen Dempsey and William E. Thoms.
(Quorum Boob, 1986). Pp. xi 349. ISBN #0-89930-138-X
It has been over a dozen years since the first signs of economic 
deregulation surfaced in the transportation industry. The regulatory 
reform movement brought major policy changes to the once static 
operating and pricing environments. Even though many segments of 
the industry were deregulated, there are still several important 
reasons why practitioners as well as students might find an examina­
tion of past laws and regulatory practices valuable. First, despite 
deregulation, it must be realized there are still major portions of the 
transportation legal structure which remain intact More impor­
tantly, recent changes in the competitive structure of the transporta­
tion industry have focused new attention on the results of deregula­
tion. These events may force a policy shift away from the free 
market toward some form of economic reregulation of select modal 
segments.
It is difficult to resolve current policy problems without a 
thorough knowledge of the history of transportation legislation and 
regulatory environment The text, Law and Economic Regulation in 
Transportation, provides an easy, readable, and practical format to 
build this comprehensive understanding of the past, present, and 
future transportation policy direction.
The book contains eight chapters examining three separate but 
interrelated topics. The general subject matters include: (1) the 
history of transportation regulation, (2) a detailed examination of 
economic regulation, and (3) select topics in transportation law.
Chapter 1 provides a brief synopsis of the growth of domestic 
transportation law. The text does an adequate job of providing a 
legislative framework for understanding the economic regulation of
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all modes of transportation. The discussion begins with the public 
toll roads of the late 1 700's and traces current regulation up to the 
legislation of the early 1980's.
The next three chapters detail the legislation, court cases, and 
rules which supply the basis for economic regulation. Chapter 2 
covers current and past policies involved with entry, exit, and 
adequacy of service for the various modes. This chapter provides 
insight into policy decisions related to the competitive structure of 
the transportation industry. Chapter 3 is an overview of rate 
regulation for all the individual modes. This chapter examines the 
rationale for rate regulation and the changes to pricing policy as a 
result of deregulation. Chapter 4 examines issues surrounding 
antitrust practices and financial regulation of the modes. This 
chapter is extremely useful in understanding today's complex 
regulatory environment. Currently, there is confusion over the 
changing role of rate bureaus, application of antitrust regulations and 
the reversal of several recent merger decisions.
The last four chapters cover select subjects of law and economic 
regulation in transportation. These include: liability, government 
involvement in rail operation, labor legislation, and mass transit. 
Chapter 5 explores liability issues in transportation beginning with its 
evolution from common law. This topic could be of particular 
interest to practitioners since it describes changes in liability caused 
by regulatory reform in the rail, motor, and air segments.
Chapter 6 examines the role of the government in the operation 
of the nation's domestic rail system. Specifically, the chapter 
describes the past and present government involvement with 
Amtrak, commuter passenger services, and ConRail.
No text written about transportation law is complete without a 
brief survey of labor legislation. Chapter 7 provides a concise 
explanation of the legislation utilized in the resolution of transporta­
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tion industry labor disputes. Topics include a brief summary of the 
pertinent labor laws as well as a discussion of specific labor issues 
such as the protection of the transportation employees jobs.
The final chapter includes subjects which are often times not 
covered in a text of transportation law and regulation. Chapter 8 
provides an overview of the origin and structure of mass transit's 
legal environment
Law and Economic Regulation in Transportation can be 
effectively utilized as an introductory transportation law text as well 
a supplement to advanced transportation policy seminars. The 
material has application for students with limited knowledge of 
transportation law as well as industry practitioners who require more 
specific and detailed information.
Overall, Law and Economic Regulation in Transportation 
provides a useful, practical, and comprehensive understanding of the 
legal and economic regulation in the transportation industry.
Gary S. Wilson
Assistant Professor of Transportation/Logistics
Western Illinois University
Volume 2, Number I 127

SPECIAL ISSUE
A special issue of the Journal of Transportation Management devoted to Air 
Cargo will be published in 1991. This future publication is being made 
possible as a result of a grant from Federal Express Corporation. Please 
contact the editors or publisher for additional information.
FUTURE EVENTS AND ACTIVITIES
Delta Nu Alpha's 50th Anniversary will be celebrated in Philadelphia on 
September 12-15, 1990 at the Fourth Annual Combined Education 
Conference co-sponsored with the American Society of Transportation and 
Logistics.
TRANSPORTATION RESEARCH FORUM
The Transportation Research Forum has announced their 32nd Annual 
Meeting will be held October 10-12, 1990 in Long Beach, California. For 
additional information, please contact the TRF National offices at Suite 905, 
1600 Wilson Blvd., Arlington, Virginia 22209.

